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ABSTRACT
For many Egyptians, the only path to modernity in the Egyptian
legal system is believed to be through utilizing Islamic sharia’a.
Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Egyptian legal
elite worked to introduce a modern interpretation and application of
Islamic sharia’a. The Islamic principles takhayur and talfiq were
used to do this. While the main usage of takhayur and talfiq was to
legitimize the modern legal system by maintaining the usage of
Islamic sharia’a, the legal practice reached a contradictory
outcome. The Courts have been unable to decide on the exact
relationship between Islamic sharia’a and other legal texts. This
confusion has produced ambiguity and uncertainty in legal practice.
This situation of uncertainty in the legal system is inevitable
because of the differences in the underlying nature and philosophy
of the modern and sharia’a legal systems. Accordingly, the
Egyptian legal system may require additional secular reform to
reduce the uncertainty by stressing the superiority of the legal text.
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I.

Introduction

Since the 25th of January uprising, laws has been at the core of discussions
among Egyptians. Egyptians generally believes that laws are closely connected
to the political system, and that developing and amending laws is an important
avenue for solving many problems. Despite the fact that the development of laws
is demanded by most Egyptians, there is no clear understanding of an
appropriate path. Debates about how to best develop Egyptian laws often ends
with disagreement on the identity of laws, and specifically whether they are
Islamic or secular.
Followers of the debates within Egyptian communities will easily note how the
debate often focuses on Islamicity. Even the non-Islamic political groups,
whether socialist or mainstream liberal, defend their point of view based on the
level of Islamicity of their views and conformity with Islamic legal jurisprudence or
fiqh.
There is a confused understanding of legal development through the traditions of
Islamic Sharia’a and Fiqh. This is based on ignorance of the nature of both the
Islamic and modern legal systems. Modern law is based on the existence of only
one legal answer to every legal problem, but Islamic application is based on the
existence of multiple legal answers from the different Islamic schools or
madhabs. So while a modern law system supports one set of connected legal
rules for governing, Islamic jurisprudence has its different schools each with its
own understandings.
In modern law, all people are obliged to follow the same legal rule; jurists’
opinions are not obligatory for any court or state authority to follow. But under the
sharia’a system, deciding the applicable rule depends on the free will of people
and which schools they favor. This difference is very important to understand
when considering the melding of both secular and Islamic systems.
This research discusses the application of Islamic principles, takhayur and talfiq,
in the modernization of the Egyptian legal system. It has not created a modern
legal system, rather it has created a hybrid legal system with tensions between
the ideologies of both sharia’a and modernity evident.
The research focuses on an understanding of the historic chronology of the
introducing of modernity into the Egyptian legal system, through exploring
opinions of well-known thinkers such as Muhammad Abdou and Abdulraziq Al-
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Sanhuri in addition to Western influence. It shows how this hybrid modernity has
led to problems in the application. This is because of the principles of takhayur
and talfiq in and of themselves has not lead to the Islamizing of the legal system
but rather the creation of rigidity in the developing of laws due to the divine
nature of Islamic rules. This is clarified in the discussion of Court rulings
regarding the interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, and Article
60 of the Egyptian Penal Code.
The amendment of family laws in 2000 is an example of the hybrid legal system
issue. Many social groups opposed such amendment claiming that the new code
is less Islamic than the old one. This claim is based on the allowance of selfdivorce for women, or Khul’, in the new code. This is a clear application of
takhayur and talfiq whereby the new text adopted the minor opinion of a group in
the Malikite School which believes that self-divorce is granted according to their
understanding of a prophetic telling.1 However, many legal experts believe that
this law is not in conformity with Islamic sharia’a and defend the old law as being
much more Islamic. At the same time however takhayur and talfiq was also
utilized in the former family law to generate the former rules of marriage. The
rejection was not based on the usage of takhayur and talfiq, but was directed
more towards the believed Islamicity of the former law against the new
amendment.2This is a clear example of the problematic situation of considering
state modern laws incorporating Islamic sharia’a. Of course this Islamic dialogue
is present in some laws more than others, such as family, criminal and civil laws.
But the effect of such a linkage between religion and law affects the legal and
political practice as a whole.
This paper argues that modernizing Egyptian laws through Islamic sharia’a
principles of takhayur and talfiq has confused the understanding of the position of
Islamic sharia’a in the modern legal system. This confused understanding is a
result of differences between both Islamic and modern legal systems. This is
seen in the Egyptian high courts’ decisions regarding the interpretation of Islamic
sharia’a and its position in the legal system.

See Oussama Arabi, The Dawning of the Third Millennium on Shari’: Egypt’s
Law no. 1 of 2000, or Women May Divorce at Will, Vol. 16, No.1 ALQ (2001), pp.
2-21.
2 See J.N.D. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN EGYPT: 1850-1950, POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT, at 209-230, in P.M. HOLT (ED.), London:
Oxford University Press, 1968.
1
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The following chapter gives a brief background on the transition from the
traditional legal system to the current one. This will be shown through the historic
reasons for and the philosophy of using takhayur and talfiq to modernize the
legal system. The third chapter analyzes for the use of takhayur and talfiq in the
modern legal system. It focuses on the differences between sharia’a and modern
legal system, and the unprecedented results of that application. In chapter four,
Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution which states that Islamic sharia’a is the
principal source of legislation, will be analyzed through the judicial verdicts from
the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Constitutional Court. In chapter five,
Article 60 in the Egyptian Penal code which exempts actions committed in
accordance with Islamic sharia’a from the application of penal code, will be
analyzed. It will be shown through the Court of Cassation verdicts how the
sharia’a interpretation is very problematic and that the court has classified it at
times as being superior to the legal text, and at other times as being inferior to it.
The court also uses Islamic sharia’a to defend the existing laws and to interpret
its legal texts.
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II. From Traditionalism to Modernity: The Path of The Egyptian Legal
System
Starting in the late nineteenth century, the Egyptian legal system has been
transformed from the traditional Islamic Sharia’a system into a more modern
legal system. This transition has been accompanied by extensive juridical and
legal reform. Since this transitional phase, an extended debate regarding the
Islamicity of the Egyptian legal system compared to the secular western laws has
occurred. This debate has been led by modernist thinkers, whereby they have
introduced their new vision and understanding of Islamic Sharia’a laws. The
modernist thinkers are not only legal figures such as Abdulraziq Al-Sanhuri, but
also religious figures such as Muhammad Abdou who headed the religious
institution of Dar el-e’ftaa’ as the Mufti. From the beginning it was clear that
reform of the legal system and the traditional application of Islamic laws was
required. This necessity was aroused by several problems faced by Egyptians
during that time especially after the colonization era. While this reform targeted
the clarity of the legal rule, it embedded legal uncertainty as it progressed.
One of the major ideas of that movement was introducing Islamic fiqh techniques
as a development tool. It was thought that legal reform was possible through
Islamic sharia’a itself. One of the techniques was borrowing the concepts of
takhayur and talfiq from the classical application of Islamic sharia’a to introduce
legal reform. Although the usage of these techniques was a brilliant innovation,
the problematic understanding of the situation of Islamic sharia’a in the modern
legal system would later introduce contradictions and ambiguity in their
application, which continue to this day.
In this chapter, the traditional understanding of takhayur and talfiq will be
introduced through their legal and religious application. The second part focuses
on the necessity of an emerging new modern legal system. The ideas of
Egyptian legal thinkers and the legal and political situation of the Egyptian state
will also be explored.
A. Takhayur and Talfiq:
The application

of

Islamic sharia’a

is

historically known

through

the

understandings of various schools or madhabs3. The Islamic application of divine

3

To understand the meaning of Madhab, see W.B.HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW, 150, (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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regulations was generally achieved through different methods of interpretation of
religious texts of the holy book Quran, and the prophetic sayings or Hadiths of
the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. The method of interpretation of the religious
texts depended on particular historical chronologies that differed from one school
to another; each method of understanding represented a separate school or
madhab. Each school had its own logic to achieve its particular legal outcome,
whether through established legal rules or general understanding of Islamic
Sharia’a. Traditionally, it was a common practice to apply the jurisdiction of
different Islamic schools or madhabs at the same time. But not every school had
the same chances to be applied. It depended historically on a school’s popularity
and reputation, or the state’s support for such school.4 Accordingly takhayur and
talfiq techniques emerged due to the existence of different jurisdictions of Islamic
schools. Takhayur and talfiq were organized differently by the traditional Islamic
schools. In the following section brief definitions of takhayur and talfiq will be
illustrated with examples of its traditional application and the position of the
modern Islamic religious institution of Dar el-e’ftaa’.
1. Takhayur Definition:
Firstly takhayur means literally: the selection. It represents the process of
choosing among the different opinions of Islamic scholars and madhabs with no
limitation on the range of Islamic schools.5 It is based on the well-known principle
that “an ordinary layperson is not a school follower” or “Al-’amy la’ mazhab lahu”.6
This means that each ordinary human being who is not a scholar or a student of
one of the scholars or sheikhs, has the right to choose among the different
opinions and select whichever opinion applies best to his personal issue.7
This principle of takhayur was widely accepted in Islamic sharia’a. Most Islamic
schools did not deny the right of each person to utilize takhayur, as long as
he/she was committed to the opinion of the selected school. For example, if
See generally W.B. HALLAQ, SHARI’: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, 159221, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009).
5 Id, at 448.
6 See Dr. Abdulaziz Ezzat El-Khayat, Al’Akhz Bel Rukh’as wa Hukmahu, Vol. 8,
MAJALLAT MUJAMA’ AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI, at 237-255, (2010), available at
http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-8356/page-12243#page-12245; also see the
Taqlid And Talfiq Section on The official website of Egyptian Dar el-e’ftaa
website,
20/11/2012,
http://daralifta.org.eg/AR/ViewFatawaConcept.aspx?ID=127, (last viewed 1/9/2016).
7 Id.
4
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following the Hanafite school in marriage, all issues related to the marriage and
divorce required the consideration of the Hanafite School.8
2. Talfiq Definition:
Secondly, talfiq means the connecting, mixing or amalgamation of schools’
opinions. Sometimes a person may combine different opinions of Islamic schools
and madhabs to reach a new opinion. This is known as talfiq, which is an
amalgamation of two jurisprudential opinions in order to achieve a third outcome
found to be more beneficial. Accordingly, takhayur is the first step taken towards
talfiq. But unlike takhayur, the talfiq technique was disputed in the traditional
Islamic schools.9 This is because the application of talfiq led to new applications
of legal rules that may contradict with the logic of ordinary schools. In general
Islamic schools were keen on applying their vision of sharia’a, but talfiq led to the
application of new hybrid opinions that do not represent a single school.
3. Application of Takhayur and Talfiq in The Traditional Islamic
Context:
To best understand the controversy, it is important to understand that in Islamic
Sharia’a there is a differentiation between relations between people, or
Moa’amalat, and one’s relation to God, or A’aebadat. In the sharia’a application,
the Islamic principles are applied in both instances. Accordingly, takhayur and
talfiq can be applied to the rules organizing religious obligations such as prayers,
or intra-personal relations such as contracts and marriage. Traditionally, it was
acceptable for takhayur and talfiq techniques to be used by individuals between
each other or to God, but this did not apply to state authorities, unlike the modern
trend of its use by the legislative authorities.10

Islamic schools took different positions regarding the application of talfiq. Some
schools strictly limited its scope of application, while others broadened the scope.
To understand the traditional understanding of talfiq, it is important to differentiate
between two types of amalgamation or talfiq whether through branches of
Sharia’a or within certain issues related to one of the sharia’a branches. For
8

Id 6, also supra note 2 at 420-421, Modernizing Egyptian law.
See supra note 6.
10 Supra note 2, There was another tool of justification for the governor’s actions
which is al-Syasa al- Shara’ia but takhayur and talfiq were not generally from
these tools, supra note 4.
9
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example, if one person applied the opinions of one scholar in his prayers, and
opinions of another scholar in his commercial relations, it is known as taqlid or
the “following” of scholars. It is considered to be a form of takhayur only, with no
talfiq or amalgamation taking place.11

The second form of application to particular issues is the talfiq, which means
mixing the opinions of two different scholars to reach a third opinion. For
example, talfiq is exhibited when a man marries a woman with no custodian or
wali in accordance with the Hanafite School; the same person requires the
custodian’s approval for his second marriage in accordance with the Shafiite
School. Here, the same man uses two different and contradictory opinions of
scholars to conclude his two marriage contracts.12
Generally, Islamic scholars classify talfiq into three types: the rejected, the
possibly accepted and the preferably accepted.13 Most classical schools limit the
talfiq to particular cases, widening the scope of the rejected talfiq. Their
justification for widening the scope of rejection is that talfiq is meant to ease the
life of Muslims where different Islamic schools exist, but talfiq is not to waste the
essence of Islamic rule through chasing exceptions or rukhas of different
opinions.14

There are several conditions set by these scholars for talfiq to be valid. Firstly it
must not follow the exceptions and allowances, or rukhas, because such
following wastes the purpose of the sharia’a rule. One example of that is
employing talfiq among different schools’ opinions to conclude a marriage
contract with no witnesses, custodian or the marriage payment or mahr.15
Secondly, it must not affect the legal impact and consequences of the opinions
employed. For example, if someone claims that according to most Sunni schools
all alcohol, or ‘Anbeeza, is strictly forbidden, or haram, and according to the
Hanafite School, alcohol or ‘Anbeeza, except wine, is not forbidden as long as a

11

Supra note 4, and supra note 6
See Fahd Bin Abdul Rahman Al-Yahia, Dwabet el-ikhtiar bayn Aqwal AlFoqaha’ fe masa’il El-Iktsad El-Islami, or Guidelines for Selection from the
Statements of Muslim Jurists in Matters Relating to Islamic Economics, at 515560, (The Seventh International Conference Of Islamic Economy Working Paper
Group,
April
2008,
available
at
http://www.kau.edu.sa/Files/121/Researches/56917_27234.pdf).
13 Supra note 6.
14 See supra note 6.
15 Supra note 4 and 6.
12
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person does not get drunk. Deduction from the first opinion that wine is a form of
alcohol, and then another deduction in accordance with second opinion that wine
is not haram as long as no person gets drunk is a form of the rejected talfiq.16
Thirdly, the most essential condition for talfiq to be valid is that it must be
concluded by an ordinary layperson or Al’amy, who is not a scholar, follower, or
student of any madhab. However, there were minor opinions accepting the
application of talfiq by the governor or sahib wilaya.17
4. Current Official Religious Institution Position
The official institution of fatwa in Egypt, Dar el-e’ftaa, describes the talfiq as an
accepted tool as long as it is not against the consensus of scholars or ijmaa’,
because it is a tool of convenience and development of the people’s interest.18
This institution represents the new trend of Islamic thinking by widening the
scope of application of talfiq to ease the requirements of life. This coincides with
modernist elite thinking about the application of Sharia’a in modern law. Dar ele’ftaa makes one single limitation on the application of talfiq that is that it not
contradict with Ijmaa’ or the consensus of scholars and jurists of a certain age.
According to this understanding of Dar el-e’ftaa every age has its own special
Ijmaa’ that must be followed. Accordingly in modern times, the Ijmaa’ application
is narrowed to a few consensual opinions only which allows greater talfiq
application.

To sum up takhayur and talfiq are Islamic techniques that have been utilized to
solve the problems associated with the multi-jurisdiction of Islamic schools within
the same society and under the same authority. While takhayur is generally
accepted by them, the talfiq is limited by most schools, the modern religious
institution of Dar el-e’ftaa’ has widened the scope in favor of modernism.
B. The Necessity of A New Understanding of Islamic Law
Modernism was introduced to the Egyptian state and society with the French
invasion of Egypt between 1798 and 1801. Since this time, the Egyptian state
and social elite have become increasingly interested in successful modern
models of European states. This interest and admiration is not separate from the
complex and problematic application of the traditional Islamic legal system.
16

See supra note 2.
Supra note 6 and 12.
18 See supra note 6.
17
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Reform of the legal system was a very accepted idea especially in the second
half of the nineteenth century. The ideology of modernity challenged the Islamic
understanding of a legal rule and its application. The conservative Islamic elite
rejected the reform on the basis of Western legal systems. In addition to the
social and political interest in maintaining the Islamic religious system, the state
joined the side of the conservatives in rejecting modernism. Such state support
did not last for a long time because of the unprecedented application of Western
laws in the Egyptian territories which increased interest in developing the legal
system. Accordingly, the only accepted proposition of modernity is that linked to
Islamic sharia’a to avoid the complications of the traditional system and to
maintain the religious sentiment of the social and political elite. Historically, most
modern reform ideas were represented in the Islamic context and as a valid
application of Islamic sharia’a.
The following section will briefly describe the historic reasons for requiring reform
of the judicial and legal system. This is followed by a discussion of the most
important ideas of modernity introduced to Egyptian society since the nineteenth
century by the most influential thinkers of the time, most notably Rifa’a Tahtawi,
Muhammad Abdou and AbdulRaziq Al-Sanhuri.
1. Required Judicial And Legal Review
To understand the necessity for modernizing the legal system in Egypt, it is
useful to understand the legal system existing at that time and understanding
Western influence and interference in the Egyptian legal system.
a. The Existing Legal System
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Egyptian legal system was
completely based on the traditional application of Islamic laws or sharia’a, which
is based on the principle of authority or wilaya. The traditional principle of wilaya
means that the governor’s authority is the rightful author or waly al’-amr which
includes the judicial authority. According to this theory there is no clear distinction
between the judicial authority and the executive one. Governors, ministers, chiefs
of state different councils and even administrative members may make judicial
decisions. And parallel to this is the governor or state chief appointing of the

9
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judge or qadi to exercise an additional form of judicial and legal authority. In this
way there is a dual nature of judicial decisions in the state. 19
The second feature of the traditional judicial system is the multiplicity of legal
answers, which is unlike the modern legal system. The traditional Islamic sharia’a
system is based on Islamic schools’ understandings and interpretation of
religious texts, which is known generally as fiqh. The Islamic fiqh is based on a
certain understanding and interpretation of religious scripture – the Quran and
the prophetic sayings or hadiths. Each school defines its own tools for extracting
the legal rule from these texts and how to arrive at the correct understanding.
The legal field at that time was multijurisdictional; all of the existing Islamic
schools could be applied separately or from drawing among them, unless the
ruler or the governor forbade it. It was commonly known that judicial decisions,
even from the same qadi, who apply different Islamic schools’ opinions to the
same legal issue, create multiple legal answers for it. This feature of the legal
system was commonly known as a judicial forum, whereby litigants chose the
favored judge or school to ensure their legal interests.
b.Western Influence And Legal Reform
By the end of the Muhammad’s Ali period in 1844, special courts had been
created in Egypt known as the consulate courts. These courts were administered
by foreign and Western embassies. Judges were not Egyptian, and the
governing legal texts were not Egyptian laws or Islamic sharia’a but the Western
laws of each state. When an applicant, whether Egyptian or foreign, was required
to stand before this court, and if an appeal was required, it would be held in the
foreign state’s court of appeal.20 This situation continued till 1875 when a new
judicial authority was established: the mixed courts.21 These mixed courts were
composed of Egyptian and foreign judges who applied laws on Egyptian land,
regarding cases involving inter-Egyptian and non-Egyptian parties. Mixed courts
played a major role in introducing modern laws to Egypt, and the understanding
of the European judges of such modern laws.
Both the consulate and mixed courts were introduced as a privileged system
within the Ottoman state in general, under whose authority Egypt rested. Most of
19

See supra note 1 and supra note 3.
See MUHAMMAD 'ABD AL-BARI, AL-'LMTIYAZAT AL-AJNABIYYAH, 23-32, (AlQahirah: Lajnat Al-Ta'lif Wal-Taijamah Wal-Nashr, 1930).
21 Id.
20
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the cases decided before these courts were commercial in nature due to the
common trade enjoyed by the Western states. By 1850, it was not an unusual
phenomenon for the Ottoman state to issue a commercial code to be used by the
mixed courts to ensure foreigners’ interests in the state; this new commercial
code was translated from the French code with no apparent change.22
At this point it is important to focus on the French judicial system which inspired
the new legal system. By this time in the nineteenth century, the new French
legal elite, including judges and lawyers, still maintained the theological
understanding of laws. Through these understandings, many attempts by French
courts were made to utilize those understandings in the interpretation and
application of civil code texts. French courts applied texts of their own civil code
of

that time

in accordance

with

their

own

religious

and theological

understandings, but with no reference to that process in their legal work. Such
application was introduced by the French judges in the mixed courts as an
ideological innovation, and was adopted later by the Egyptian legal elite. 23
By 1883, national courts had been established to solve the multijurisdictional
problems existing at that time. However, these national courts did not totally
replace the authority of the traditional judges. The total replacement would not
happen until a few decades later with the abolishment of the traditional judicial
system of qadi shara’i. The clearest sign of the transformation taking place during
this period was the existence of new codifications, such as the commercial and
civil codes. Both the civil and commercial codes were translations of the
corresponding French codes. This was obvious in the work of the national court
judges who were required to navigate the ambiguity of the legal texts of the
French system.24
c. Codification Trend:
The codification of legal rules was the most popular focus since the national
courts’ establishment in 1883; it was not restricted to the Egyptian legal system
but extended to other Islamic states which adopted forms of codification. Even
22

See Heba Abdel Halim Sewilam, The Jurisprudential Problems of the Early
Codification Movement in the Middle East: a Case Study of the Ottoman Mejelle
and the 1949 Egyptian Civil Code, at 130, (PHD dissertation in Islamic Studies,
University of California, 2011); also supra note 20.
23 See id Heba Sewilam, at 60.
24 See ENID HILL, AL-SANHURI AND ISLAMIC LAW , THE PLACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
ISLAMIC LAW IN THE LIFE AND W ORK OF ABDALRAZZAQ AL-SANHURI, 120, (Cairo
Papers In Social Sciences, Volume 10, Monograph 1, Spring 1987).
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the Ottoman state, which represented the last Islamic caliphate, adopted the
codification of legal rules, whereas the Hanafite doctrine was represented in an
equivalent code to that of the civil code.

25

This code was called Al-Majalla al-

ahkam al-‘adliyya, or the Magazine of Justice Rules. While it was not actually
applied in Egypt, the experiment influenced the legal thinking of Arabs and
Muslims including Egyptian thinkers alike.26
Another codification attempt of the Islamic sharia’a was by Muhammad Qadri
Pasha, a former judge and legal thinker of that time. He believed in the
mechanism of the Napoleonic code while maintaining his deep belief in applying
the religious rules of Islamic Sharia’a. Accordingly, he worked with others on
codifying the Islamic sharia’a in Al-murshid or The Guide, which he considered
as an Islamic replacement of the corresponding French civil law and to organize
commercial transactions. Later on, he attempted to codify the personal status
code based on the Hanafite doctrine, similar to the Al-Majalla in the Ottoman
state. They introduced al-waqf law, or religious endowments, also named qanun
al-‘ada wal- insaf, which later on was heavily criticized by Al-Sanhuri for being an
exception to the civil code rules by deviating from and minimizing its grounds.27
2. Introducing Modernity:
By the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, many Egyptian writers and
thinkers promoted the concept of the modern Western legal and political systems
as successful examples that could also be employed in Egypt. Emphasis on the
similarity between these systems and Islamic sharia’a systems was made.
a. Rifa’a Tahtawi
Rifa’a Tahtawi, one of the well-known Egyptian thinkers of that era, introduced in
his book The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris the French legal and
political system. He published that book after finishing his education in France,
which was organized under the authority of Muhammad Ali. In his book, he
included an early Arabic translation of the French constitution existing at that
time. He did not simply translate the constitution. He also introduced his vision
25

See GUY BECHOR, THE SANHURI CODE AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN ARAB
CIVIL LAW, 32-37, (Brill, Leiden Boston, 2007).
26 See id; even Al-Sanhuri started his invitation for adopting more modern legal
system through analyzing and criticizing Al-Majalla application in Iraq and Syria,
see supra note 23 at 60.
27 See supra note 23 and supra note 20.
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and ideas about the similarity between French constitutional principles and
Islamic sharia’a principles, with repeated emphasis on the consistency between
modern legal texts and Islamic sharia’a. Tahtawi not only translated what he saw
in the French legal system, but indirectly proposed the adoption of the modern
French system in Egypt. One of the ways Tahtawi did this was by using Islamic
terms in his translation. For example, he translated democracy as shura, which is
an Islamic term referring to the reconciliation methodology of making decisions.
He affirmed that the shura principle in Islamic understanding is equivalent to
democracy. Another example is Tahtawi’s translation of taxes into zakat, in an
effort to compare the monetary system of the Western state to that of the
traditional Islamic one, whereby zakat was collected by the state as its main
financial resource and based on a religious obligation.28
The most important innovation of Tahtawi was to consider law as being
equivalent to both Shari’ and Sharia’a, bridging the difference between both legal
systems. He claimed that the Western legal system is the same as traditional
Islamic sharia’a, and suggested adoption of modern legal techniques to develop
the Egyptian legal system.29
b.Muhammad Abdou
Tahtawi’s attempt to relate modernization to Islamic sharia’a was not unique to
that century. This idea continued to develop among thinkers including
Muhammad Abdou, a well-known Egyptian Mufti in the late nineteenth century.
Muhammad Abdou, who was an Al-Azhar student and politician fighting the
authoritarian political system of the British occupation,30 was granted a very
unique position as judge of the national courts in 1888.31 Abdou, who believed
Aristotle’s philosophy of reason, introduced a new understanding of traditional
Islamic Sharia’a. He affirmed the acceptance of all Islamic schools as long as
these schools did not contradict the basic core of religion. Accordingly, all Islamic
schools whether Sunni or Shiite were considered to be valid legal sources.
See, RIFA‘A RAFI‘ AL-TAHTAWI, AN IMAM IN PARIS, ACCOUNT OF STAY IN FRANCE
BY AN EGYPTIAN CLERIC (TAKHLIS AL-EBRIZ FI TALKHIS BARIZ AW AL-DIWAN ALNAFIS BI-IWAN BARIS), 15-29 &189-194, Daniel L. Newman trans. &ed., SAQI,
2004), (1826-1831).
29 See id.
30 See, Aswita Taizir, Muhammad ‘Abduh And The Reformation Of Islamic Law,
at 7-10, (MA Dissertation In Islamic Studies, The Institute Of Islamic Studies,
MCGILL University, Montreal, Canada, 1994).
31 Id, at 12.
28
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Abdou believed that God gave to humankind practical and theoretical authority
and through them the development of laws was accepted as long as it did not
reject major Islamic beliefs.32 Abdou, who was known as a religious reformer,
introduced the takhayur technique as the preferred legal implement that could be
applied by state authorities to achieve development and modernity, especially
through judicial and legislative authorities.

33

In an article in al-Ahram, Abdou emphasized the necessity of benefiting from
modern science. He suggested, as a revolutionary idea, studying other religious
and legal systems to create such development:
The ‘ulama (scientists) who are the spirit of the nation have failed so far
to see the benefit of the modern sciences. They continue to busy
themselves with what might have been suitable for a time that is long
gone by, not realizing the fact that we are living in a new world. We must
study the affairs of other religions and states in order to learn the secret
of their advancement. We see no reason for their position of wealth and
power except their progress in education and the sciences in their
countries.34
Abdou proposed the reform of traditional Islamic courts or Mahakem shara’ia,
which were still employing traditional judicial procedures. These ideas were the
grounds for later reform of the Islamic law application in the modern legal
model.35

Abdou faced the problem of the contradiction between the traditional application
of talfiq and its new approach. Traditionally, talfiq could only be concluded by an
ordinary layperson who is not a school follower. Abdou suggested that Ijtihad, the
Islamic principle of getting legal rules out of religious scripts, is necessarily
concluded by the governors of the state or wali al-amr.36 Such a requirement was
necessary because the state governors were qualified by their positions to
determine and achieve the people’s interests or maslaha musrsala.37 The state
also got help from a wide range of experts including scientists and jurists, who
could maintain the people’s interests or maslaha musrsala and the Islamicity of
application. 38
id at 24 – 27.
See supra note 22.
34 Supra note 30, at 7.
35 Supra note 30, at 14-15.
36 Supra note 30, at 29 & 34 – 38.
37 Supra note 30, at 24-29.
38 Supra note 30, at 34-38, Abdou stated that Ijtihad could be concluded by army
chiefs, head of universities, physicians, and commercial experts and so on.
32
33
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As a judge, Abdou sought the singularity of the legal answer which is a modern
approach. He realized that people would never unify their religious school or
opinions of interpretation. Abdou mentioned one of the Quran verses, Hud 118,
which states that “Lord God did not will to create one people”. God’s will is
represented by the existence of numerous schools and interpretations of the
same text. Each opinion is based on a different vision of what the interests of the
people or masalih are.39 At the same time, Abdou criticized the existing modern
codes issued after the creation of the national courts. Those laws were more or
less a translation of the corresponding French laws. He considered them as
ignoring the message of God and Islamic sharia’a. He proposed an entirely new
talfiq among Islamic schools to achieve a sort of modern legal system, similar to
that of Western states but in Islamic form. This talfiq is based on the interests of
society and not bound by certain madhabs or methodologies of interpretation.40
There was a broader field from which to formulate new legislation deemed
justifiable on the basis of new ijtihad rules. He rejected the old application of
Islamic schools who considered this set of rules as the only representation of
Islamic messages from God, while other interpretations considered them as kufr,
or ungodly.41 And, he considered all Islamic schools as being valid. Abdou’s idea
was that all Islamic schools emanated from an understanding of the same Islamic
scripture to achieve God’s will. Thus, they all target the goodness of people, and
represent good faith.42
c. Abdul-Raziq Sanhuri
Another thinker who believed in modernity through Islamic sharia’a was AbdulRaziq Sanhuri. He, as a well-known legal thinker, imagined a broader solution for
such chaos in the juridical and legal application in Egypt. He believed in the new
modern understanding of Islamic sharia’a that was adopted by Muhammad
Abdou. He employed these ideas through comparative legal thinking as a law
professor and judge, and considered Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh as a source of
modern civil law.43

39

Supra note 30, at 34-36.
Supra note 30, at 51-54.
41 Supra note 30, at 46-51.
42 Supra note 30, at 19-21.
43 Supra note 25.
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Sanhuri emphasized the special nature of the proposed modern civil code as
leading to the emergence of a new modern Islamic jurisprudence in his speech
before the Egyptian senate in 1948:
In it we put together the codified provisions of the Islamic law and set
them beside western law, as represented in the new Egyptian code…and
this paves the way for the third and final stage, the rebirth of Islamic
jurisprudence, … for the day when this jurisprudence becomes the
source of modern civil provisions, when it becomes as well- adapted to
the currents of the civilization of the present age as the most modern and
progressive codes. 44
Sanhuri adopted a clear understanding of Islamic sharia’a as a source of law
similar to Roman law in Western legal systems. He believed that modernizing the
Egyptian legal system should take place through the principles of Islamic
sharia’a. He classified Islamic sharia’a into two sets of rules: religious and legal.
Sanhuri’s idea were based on the historical classification of sharia’a into rules
governing relations between people and relations with God. The parts that are
related to relations with God are the rules of faith that cannot be challenged or
changed by any legal rule.45 On the other hand, the legal rules that organize the
relationship between people is the core of Islamic sharia’a that are incorporated
in comparative and legal work.46 Sanhuri emphasized the formulation of Islamic
sharia’a into a large source of law by separating the religious from the secular.47
Sanhuri’s belief was made clearer in his speech before the Egyptian Senate on
the introduction of the new civil code. He emphasized the point that the
application of the new civil code representing Islamic law was inherited from
within and maintained sharia’a role in its application.
Later on, Sanhuri promoted the inclusion of Islamic sharia’a in the application of
the civil code in several respects.48 First, Islamic sharia’a was to be the judge’s
tool in solving civil cases in the event of the code silence for an applicable rule.
The judge could extract a general rule from Islamic sharia’a to be applied in such
cases. It is akin to Roman law which acted as an open legal source for the
judiciary in the event of textual absence.

44

See supra note 22.
Supra note 25
46 Supra note 25
47 See supra note 22.
48 See supra note 22, at 83 -88.
45
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Secondly, there are a lot of legal terms used in the civil code which correspond to
terms in Islamic sharia’a, however, the new terms carried particular meanings
and understandings by the Sanhuri committee, to be clarified in the illustrative
drafts, such as explaining customary rules , or al-‘urf, or the ownership rights, or
hu’quq al-melkya, through Islamic opinions.49 He included in his landmark
textbook about the sources of right a comparative study between Islamic law and
Western law, with emphasis on the existence of civil rights in the Islamic sharia’a
compatible with Western legislation.50 Even those legal rules or articles
originating directly from foreign legal systems could be linked jurisprudentially to
Islamic sharia’a whereby they can be applied in a very wide sense, and not be
bound by certain schools or madhab,51 or certain categories whether Sunni or
Shiite schools’, all schools are considered as equal sources of the new
application of the law.52
This new version of the civil code, which includes Islamic sharia’a principles, was
considered an Egyptianizing of the civil code. It solved the problem of the dual
nature of the preceding civil code as existing between the Egyptian and the
French legal systems. The Senate’s chairperson commented on the new civil
code which would solve the judicial problem:
The Egyptian judge was entitled to deal with both the Egyptian civil code
and the French civil code that when he targets any problem he need to
return back to French code to find an interpretation or a solution. 53
Sanhuri’s vision looked like a brilliant solution to Egyptian legal system problems.
It was a very revolutionary vision which changed the legal system and adhered to
Sanhuri’s wish. According to Sanhuri, the 1948 civil code was intended to create
new legal thinking which would develop in the future in consistency with Egyptian
culture.
C. Conclusion:

49

Supra note 25.
See Hesham Nasr, The Effect Of The Legal And Judicial Models On The
Development Of The Modern Arab State, at 175 -177 (PhD Dissertation in
Juridical Science, Submitted to the Faculty of the Washington College of Law of
American University, 2010).
51 See Supra note 25, at 77 -81.
52 Supra note 50, and supra note 25.
53 See supra note 22, at 91.
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The Egyptian state evolved from the classical application of Islamic law into a
more modernized system by the end of the nineteenth century. There were
different approaches to modernity, but it was largely based on the ideas of
modernist religious thinkers such as Abdou, Tahtawi and Sanhuri. This
mechanism utilized Islamic principles themselves to develop the legal system
and modernize it. From these principles takhayur and talfiq were used as
grounds for modernization. It was necessary due to existing weaknesses in the
legal system and political interference from Western states which accelerated it.
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III. Dilemma of Application of Islamic Sharia’a Principles
The application of Islamic law principles in the modernization process of the
Egyptian legal system, especially the use of takhayur and talfiq, produced an
unexpected hybrid system. The Islamic sharia’a legal system is different in
structure and philosophy from a modern positivist one. This hybrid system has
led to uncertainty in actual legal practice.
With the spread of this new ideology crowned by the approval of the modern civil
code in 1948,54 an extended dialogue about the nature and identity of the new
legal system and whether it was primarily Islamic or a modern Western one
ensued. Because each ideology had its proponents, the political system
benefited by tilting the policies towards one of the ideologies or the other as
politically required.55 Despite the incorporation of both ideologies within the legal
system, neither was ever clearly identified even after the 1980 amendment of
constitutional article 2 which transformed Islamic sharia’a principles into the
principal source of legislation.
Most legal thinkers questioned whether the current Egyptian legal system was
purely Islamic or purely modern even with the usage of takhayur and talfiq
techniques which allowed temporary social acceptance of the new legal system.
This chapter clarifies why the usage of takhayur and talfiq have not led to an
Islamic legal system and explores the unexpected problems of application.
A. Takhayur And Talfiq Did Not Create An Islamic Legal System

There are several reasons why takhayur and talfiq have not led to the creation of
an Islamic legal system. These reasons are based on fundamental differences
between the Islamic legal system and the modern legal system. Differences in
the essential features of each model of law have led to the ongoing inability to
create such a modern Islamized legal system.
1. The First Difference: Takhayur and Talfiq by State
Instead of Individuals.

The first difference between the Islamic legal system and the modern legal
system is the replacement of the role of the ordinary layperson with the state in
54
55

See supra note 22.
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the application of takhayur and talfiq. Takhayur and talfiq tools were justified
historically for use by the ordinary layperson, because he/she was not qualified
jurisprudentially to deduce the legal rule. 56 Within a system of multijurisprudential application, it was necessary to choose which legal opinion was to
be applied from the different schools. At the same time, each Islamic school had
its own system of analysis of the religious texts which produced different legal
outcomes. Even with common reasoning grounds among schools, legal rules or
ahkam shara’ya differed considerably between these schools.57The layperson
thus faced different opinions with the authority to choose among them which is
takhayur. The layperson was able to mix those opinions by also employing talfiq,
which is predictable and justifiable because of the layperson’s assumed
ignorance of the various sharia’a schools’ ideologies.
Islamic law is based on the superiority of divine law; and divine law is
represented by the Quran and prophetic sayings or hadiths. Thus, it is necessary
to interpret these texts in order to realize and follow God’s revelation.58
Interpretation, as was mentioned above, is based on each schools’ methodology
of deduction. Historically, it has been almost impossible to limit legal application
of one religious school verdicts over others. To solve such a dilemma, Islamic
doctrine created several principles to regulate the application of schools’ opinions
amongst the jurists and the u’lama such as al-Ijtihad la yazol bil Ijtihad, or no
jurists’ ijtihad can be overthrown by another jurists’ one. And to regulate the
multi-existence of schools amongst ordinary laypersons who did not follow a
certain school, the Islamic doctrine accepted principles such as takhayur and
talfiq.59
On the other hand, the modern legal system whereby state authority presides
over the legislative authority does not recognize the superiority of divine law.
Despite this fact, the state itself is entitled to act on behalf of ordinary laypersons
and utilize takhayur and talfiq and thus characterizing the system as being
modern at its core.60 This substitution of the state for the layperson, which was
suggested by such thinkers as Abdou and Al-Sanhuri, was originally intended to
relieve the tension between the Islamic and Western application of law. But in
reality it changed the importance and focus of the techniques. Takhayur and
56
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talfiq were applied by the ordinary layperson to reconcile conflicting decisions
between different schools’ opinions.61 Usage of the same techniques by the state
were meant to avoid social clash, and to widen state authority over legislation. In
other words, the usage of takhayur and talfiq changed from being a tool for
resolving personal tensions between schools to a tool for distracting people from
state policies.
To clarify the problem of the substitution of the state for the ordinary layperson, it
is useful to understand the schools’ methodology for deciding on the applicable
legal rule. Madhabs, in the traditional Islamic system, state the means of
deduction for the accurate understanding of religious texts in order to achieve the
will of God.62 Sources of religious texts are both the Quran and the prophet’s
sayings or hadiths. The Quran’s textual accuracy is generally agreed upon; it is
not the same with the hadiths. Due to the late recording and collecting of the
Prophet’s sayings, elements of fabrication interfered in the texts of hadiths.
Accordingly each school had to verify its methodology to differentiate the genuine
sayings from the fake ones. For example, the Hanafite School defines certain
qualifications for the hadith tellers. If any of these qualifications are absent, the
authenticity of the saying is doubted and its legal impact voided. For these
reasons, the Hanafite School considers the prophetic hadith concerning the
conditionality of marriage through the custodian as being doubtful because of the
non-fulfillment of the conditions of its teller, Al-Sayda Aa’esha, who allowed a
woman to marry in the absence of her custodian. This is because one of the
requirements when considering the truth of the hadith is that the teller worked in
consistency with it all his life, which was not fulfilled by Al-Sayda Aa’esha
according to the Hanafites. However the Hanafite School does not deny the right
of the custodian to approve or disapprove of a marriage based on other
sayings.63 The same prophetic saying of Al-Sayda Aa’esha is recognized by
other schools, which requires absolute custodian approval when considering the
validity of a marriage contract. So, each school deduces its own legal rules
based on its own judgment regarding the authenticity of the Prophet’s sayings.
In modern family law, the state has approved through the takhayur mechanism
the legal rule of the Hanafite School whereby a custodian is not required to fulfill
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the marriage contract of a woman.64 At the same time it ignores the
complementary Hanafite School’s opinions concerning the right of the custodian
to disapprove of the marriage. The law limited such right of the custodian to
disapprove of the marriage only for minor women in contradiction with Hanafite
doctrine which allows the disapproval of custodian for both adult and minor
women.65 And in other cases, it relies on another school’s opinion, such as the
Maliki, when considering the right of women to self-divorce based on harm, which
is contrary to the Hanafite School’s position. This type of talfiq among different
schools which is based on interpreting the same texts depending on its
authenticity, creates the law that organizes marriage laws in Egypt. Here, the
state utilizes both takhayur and talfiq to achieve legal outcomes different from the
traditional Islamic application, in spite of its roots in Islamic jurisprudence.
Whereby the valid talfiq was traditionally required to maintain the consistency of
the legal outcome of each school’s opinion, it is not required by modern laws or
even represented there.66 This makes the usage of takhayur and talfiq
methodologies very different from the traditional application, whether for the
purpose of application or establishing conditions for validity. In other words,
takhayur and talfiq are used as a method for justification rather than as a legal
mechanism for the new legal system. Even modern religious institutions such as
dar el’ e’ftaa’ which approve wider usage of the principle of takhayur, maintains
its silence about the usage of talfiq by the state in such a manner.
2. Takhayur and Talfiq have not led to Singularity in
Legal Answer

The second difference between the Islamic and modern legal systems is the
singularity of the legal answer. The application of takhayur and talfiq within
different jurisdictions reflects the plurality of the Islamic legal system, while the
modern state is supposed to have a single legal system with a single legal
authority. According to this modern positivist understanding of the singularity of
the legal answer, there have been attempts to codify doctrines of one of the
Islamic schools to present an equivalent unified system. A well-known attempt
was the codification of the Hanafite School in Al-Majalla al-ahkam al-‘adliyya, or

64

Supra note 3.
See supra note 2 and supra note 12.
66 See supra note 2 and 4.
65

22

III. DILEMMA OF APPLICATION
the Magazine of Justice Rules, by the Ottoman state.67 The Ottoman sultan
ordered a committee headed by Ahmet Jevdet, the Turkish nationalist and legal
thinker, to codify the Hanafite doctrine. The application of Al-Majalla al-ahkam al‘adliyya, or the Magazine of Justice Rules was widely criticized for being a very
selective codification, which neglected the jurisprudential grounds of the other
schools. It forced jurists, judges and lawyers, who were convinced of Al-Majalla’s
inaccuracy, to consider the same legal texts along with other schools’ opinions. A
common starting point was the application of Article no. 16 of the Al-Majalla
which stated that “no ijtihad can be overthrown by another equivalent ijtihad”. The
judges and jurists widen its scope of application by considering al-Majalla articles
as an ijtihad and equivalent to other schools’ ijtihad, keeping the application of all
schools parallel to al-Majalla.68 This was the case with forum legislation which
ended with the failure of the Ottoman state and the issuance of new national
laws. Most new civil laws in Arab countries were influenced by the Egyptian civil
code and Al-Sanhuri’s ideas. This application of taqlid, which is takhayur of a
single school’s opinions as a source of codification failed in achieving legal
stability. Talfiq between schools lead to the first difference between Islamic and
modern laws by not ensuring the shared legal outcome of different schools.69
The codification of one school of Islam did not solve the problem. Al-Majalla’s
representing only the Hanafite School in accordance with the political order of the
Ottoman state gained extensive criticism by ignoring the rest of the Islamic
doctrines. At the same time the problems associated with applying different
schools’ doctrines also prevented the full embrace of Islamic legal thinking.
3. The Divinity Of Legislation
The third difference between the Islamic and modern laws is the divinity feature.
Islamic law is based on the divinity of the legal rule. It requires deep understand
of religious texts, such as the Quran and hadiths, as the grounds and main
source of Islamic teachings and sharia’a. Accordingly, what is stated directly in
the religious texts cannot be ignored, changed or substituted. But the Islamic
schools and madhabs reached different understandings of the same religious
texts based on an understanding of the texts’ authenticity and place within
Islamic history.70 Quranic verses are interpreted in conformity with two factors,
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asbab el-nzool or the historic occasion of the text creation, in addition to the
Prophet’s sayings. These two features determine the application of the Quranic
texts. The recognized Islamic principle is that the u’lama or scholars’ findings, in
and of themselves, are not divine in nature. Stated as kulun yoa’khaz a’lyh wa
yurad ila Allah w rasuluhu, this means that every scholar’s findings can be
criticized and refuted except for God’s and the Prophet’s.71 The legitimacy of the
scholars’ opinions came out of their connection with the Quran or hadiths through
either the mechanism of al-qias or ijmaa’. In qias or deduction, scholars try to
deduce the applicable legal rule from a similarly stated verdict. For example,
alcoholic drinks are prohibited in the Malikite School because they lead to
drunkenness. This rule is deduced from the wine or Khamr drinking prohibition in
Quranic verse, as the reason behind wine’s prohibition is drunkenness, which
can be extended to other alcoholic beverages.72 Ijmaa’ or consensus legacy,
whereby an agreement between scholars is essential, is based on the prophetic
hadith stating that Muslims must never consent to wrongfulness or falseness.73 In
this way each legal rule is related in one way or another to the divinity of texts as
the source of legitimacy. This is unlike the modern legal rules which are justified
on more secular grounds. Modern laws are justified as being representative of
people’s will, or reflective of state authority, or even sometimes the natural
understanding of justice. All of these reasons separate the divine from the
profane. Even considering Islamic law as a general source of law, according to
Al-Sanhuri’s model, will not forfeit the modern feature of laws as being Islamic. It
is similar to relying on historic legal culture, whether Islamic or not depending on
each legal school’s position.74 Where modern laws accept takhayur and talfiq as
comparative legal tools in order to develop the legal system, there is no
overriding religious umbrella for the legal outcome.
B. Unprecedented Results of Takhayur and Talfiq Application.

Takhayur and talfiq application led to unprecedented and unexpected results,
which often contradict with the purpose of their usage in the legal system. The
engineer and designer of the new Egyptian civil code, Al-Sanhuri, intended to
create a modern legal system like that of other European states especially that of
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France. But Al-Sanhuri, who was both a nationalist and a socialist, believed that
sources of civil code should not contradict national culture and society. He
supported lower classes in the civil code by borrowing legal rules from Islamic
sharia’a such as waqf and al-uluu wal-sufull.75 He then delineated a hierarchy of
four legal sources comprised of written legal texts, custom, Islamic sharia’a
principles, and rules of justice and equity. In his attempt at positivism, Sanhuri
elevated legal text over all other forms of legal rules, using custom as the second
source which was similar to other Western laws in the event of textual gaps. The
most controversial work of Sanhuri’s was his identifying Islamic sharia’a as the
third source after custom and before the rules of equity and justice. 76 Order was
strictly enforced. If a written text was absent, a judge is obliged to rely on custom,
Islamic sharia’a, or rules of equity and justice in that order. Considering that
Roman law was the general legal source of law in Europe, Sanhuri tried to place
the Islamic sharia’a in a similar position. Accordingly, Islamic sharia’a would not
be applied by its schools or opinions. Just the selected rules by legislative
authority would be applied to the legal texts. In the event there were no texts or
customs to rely on, a judge would be allowed to search Islamic sharia’a for the
applicable rule. In this way, Islamic sharia’a served as a pool of rules, which the
legislative and judicial authorities could pick from as needed.77
Sanhuri and the other modernist thinkers heavily debated the civil code and its
Islamicity. Sanhuri defended the Islamicity of the new code seeing it as
representing the will of the divine, especially on the basis of the takhayur and
talfiq techniques. Under the new understanding brought by Abdou and Tahtawi,
the takhayur and talfiq tools could be used by state authority. Al-Sanhuri
defended the new civil code against accusations of Westernization. This was
rejected by Qadri Pasha,78 who tried to issue an alternative draft law by codifying
Hanafite school doctrine similar to Al-Majalla al-a’dlia. But Sanhuri, between
1933 and 1948, succeeded in convincing the legislative authority and the legal
elite through his writings and advocacy that the new draft of the law was Islamic.
This success ended the debate about other alternatives to the new civil code.79 In
the following years, with the explicit and implicit understanding of lawyers, judges
75
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and jurists about the Islamicity of the newly adopted modern system, the new
system operated on hybrid grounds.
Unexpectedly, the actual application of the new hybrid system did not follow the
expected trajectory of Sanhuri’s ideas that the new civil code would deepen
modernity in the legal system. On the contrary, the legal system, through its
hybrid nature, produced a new form of legal plurality combining Islamic and
modern laws and increasing the uncertainty of legal rules’ application. It also
forced the lawyers, judges and legislators to adopt regressive thinking about the
legal system.
1. Undecided Position For Sharia’a And Modern Laws
The legal system’s hybrid nature was intended to resolve the contradiction
between modernist and Islamic legal systems. But the tension between the
supposed superiority of the legal rule over divine law affected legal thinkers and
practitioners. Judges, lawyers and jurists were accustomed to interpreting legal
texts by drawing on Islamic opinions. Even Sanhuri himself was used to
interpreting the civil code articles through Islamic sharia’a and fiqh texts.80 Such a
methodology of interpretation directed the judicial attention to a different
interpretation of law. Courts interpreted legal texts in consistency with traditional
fiqh which could contradict with the legislative purposes of the text. Of course this
was not the case for all legal rules but, theoretically speaking, legal texts
complement each other. Thus, preferring certain texts over others lead to
changes to the entire outcome of law.
For example, one of the later modern jurists, Haraga, explained that concluding
marriage contracts for girls under eighteen years of age is valid with the approval
of the custodian, even if it is not authenticated by an official registrar. He
interpreted the family law marriage age of 18 years as a limitation, but it did not
negate the marriage contract itself as long as it maintained the same sharia’a
conditions such as the widow payment, acceptance of parties and declaration of
the marriage contract. Accordingly, a minor woman marrying is still a legal
marriage despite its contradicting criminal and family laws. Family law gives the
marriage age as eighteen years to be valid, and criminal law considers sexual
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acts with minors as a sexual crime. Generally, this opinion is expressed in the
current legal field through courts and lawyers.81
2. Legal Uncertainty:
Legal uncertainty is the second unexpected outcome of the new hybrid legal
system. The modern legal system should state clearly a single legal answer, but
this was not the case with the new system. Some Egyptian laws clearly identify
the Islamic sharia’a as active modes of application, even clearer than the civil
code. This is primarily found in personal status and family laws. Al-Sanhuri
completely rejected the separation of the personal status code from the civil code
considering it as a form of “code civique” ideology found in most modern states
guaranteeing the rights of persons on the same grounds as the civil code.82 But
in the Egyptian personal status code, the Hanafite School is explicitly stated as
the applicable law for all family issues not included in the code. It is a clear
example of the uncertainty of legal practice. To explain such uncertainty, we
need to understand the court’s authority in establishing the applicable rule
through the Hanafite doctrine. The problem with that application is that courts are
bound by two sets of rules: the family code texts and the Hanafite doctrine in that
order. The abbreviated code texts regulate a few types of family disputes, unlike
the Hanafite doctrine which is very detailed and includes different Hanafite
scholars’ opinions. Such practice lead to uncertainty and ignorance in the
application of legal rules in the family disputes, given the difficulty in predicting
the actual opinion applied by courts.83
To understand the extension of the legal rules that could be applied within the
personal status code which stated Hanafite doctrine as applicable during textual
silence, it is important to recognize that the main Islamic schools such as the
Hanafite School had many followers including jurists. Each of those jurists added
their own opinions concerning the application of Islamic laws. The Hanafite
doctrine includes also sub-doctrines of the subsequent jurists, who follow Abu
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Hanifa doctrine. Such practice of the doctrine created a body of mainstream
Hanafite doctrine that Hanafite jurists often consent upon, and a minor stream
that stemmed from different legal opinions in each juristic case. There are the
official verdicts of the Hanafite school of Abu-Hanifa - the school founder, and of
the well-known followers such as Abu-Yusuf, and Muhammad Al‑Sheybani; their
contribution is referred as masa’il al-usuliya or the main cases. Masa’il al-usuliya
embodies the main Hanafite opinions for interpreting the Quran and hadiths.
There is a second type of Hanafite doctrine which is known as masa’iI al-nawadir
or the rare cases, which is composed of Hanafite opinions about rare cases that
are not faced by the mainstream scholars.84 Also, there are writings of other
Hanafite scholars that give legal opinions by following the Hanafite methodology
of interpretation in cases. The decisive opinion amongst these various points of
views is the judge’s, as the judge is the only authorized person to choose
according to family law. Takhayur, in such an application, is practiced by the
judge himself who is authorized to choose among all of the Hanafite doctrine,
either from masa’il al-usuliya, masa’iI al-nawadir, or the other descendant’s
writings. The judge may also do a sort of talfiq between different Hanafite
opinions reaching a new legal outcome. All of these scenarios are legal and
acceptable in the legal field, and accordingly the uncertainty of the legal
application is found through the practice of law.85
The other issue about these laws is that they represent takhayur and talfiq
techniques broadly, because nearly every group of articles in family law
represent an Islamic school. Egyptian family laws are not limited to the Sunni
schools, but also include some rules derived from the Shiite schools.86 The most
innovative example of talfiq here is the khul’, or self-divorce, which is based on a
minority opinion in the Malikite School. This opinion gives women the right to selfdivorce with no restrictions on the husband’s agreement. The Khul’ rule has been
widely debated as to whether it is Islamic or non-Islamic. The Supreme
Constitutional Court decisions have avoided that claim as long as it is based on
one of the madhabs’ opinions, which is a usage of the takhayur rule. The Khul’
legality was very controversial and not common among the Malikite scholars and
represents a very minority opinion among the Malikite. Contrarily, the Egyptian
legislator and in the judicial decisions considered it an Islamic derivative; the
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opposition of such laws by radical Islamists and religious groups is based on the
ignoring of the husband’s exclusive right in divorce according to the practice of
traditional Islamic sharia’a. The problem with this debate is that it is considered to
be the use of takhayur and talfiq to produce an Islamic version of law that can be
discussed through its level of conformity with Islamic sharia’a, not as a modern
law representing the state’s intent in achieving equality between men and women
in marital contracts, and evaluated accordingly.
3. Contradictory

Positions

Between

State

Courts

And

Parliamentary Figures
Although even modern laws are uncertain, the traditional uncertainty regarding
Islamic laws is accompanied by a problem in identifying the applicable rule.
Relating laws to Islamic sharia’a does not separate the application of law from
fiqh texts, creating additional ambiguity or even derailing the legal texts by unwritten fiqh opinions.
Although the Court of Cassation has mentioned in its ruling that stating Islamic
sharia’a as the primary source of legislation in the Egyptian constitution is
directed towards the Egyptian parliament which is responsible for editing and
issuing laws, it is not the same position for the constitutional court. It has found
several rulings unconstitutional based on their non-conformity to Islamic sharia’a
as stated in the second constitutional article.
This is true even at the legislative level. In 1985, Mumtaz Nassar, who was a
member of the Egyptian parliament, encouraged parliament members to proceed
with the Islamization of the legislation hinting that:
Since 1976, the majilis al-sha’b (Egyptian parliament), began the
preparation of studies with the formation of committees and gathering
materials, a number of the studies which… [Concerned] legislating the
sharia’a in all the texts of the present laws. 87
As we see, Islamic sharia’a’s position in the modern legal system is not clear,
and Islamic preference is not based on a practical or legal basis, but rather on
the sense of its obligation to sharia’a principles. This thinking includes Egyptian
courts, which also experience a similar ambiguity to that of the French application
of the civil code in the nineteenth century. There, judges and lawyers accepted
the application of legal rules without ignoring Christian morality and theology.
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Historically, such application by French courts was applied implicitly to avoid
claims of illegality or unconstitutionality.
C. Conclusion:
The application of takhayur and talfiq as a mediation process to achieve an
Islamized modern legal system has not achieved the expected goals due to the
differences between the Islamic legal system and modern law, and the
misunderstanding of the position of Islamic law texts in the modern legal system.
The differences between the Islamic legal system and the modern legal system
are about the nature of and sources of justification for each system, and
differences in how takhayur and talfiq are used in both. As a modern legal
system seeks the singularity of its rules, Islamic law is about the plurality of its
jurisdictions. In addition to the different source of legitimacy between the Islamic
and modern legal systems, Islamic law is about divinity and modern laws are
legitimized through non-divine avenues. The making of legal rules in both
systems are quite different. Accordingly, takhayur and talfiq were introduced into
the Islamic legal system as logical methods to solve the matter of plurality. In
modern law they are used more as tools for concealing modernity in Islamic form
to be socially acceptable.
The unprecedented problems that the creation of such a hybrid legal system
entails has evaded the purposes of modernity in legal practice. Judges, jurists
and lawyers faced problems in figuring out the nature of the legal system which
increased the uncertainty of the legal practice. The hybridity of the legal system
is also affected by the existence of Islamic schools in some laws, especially
personal status and family law.
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IV. The Egyptian Constitutional Article 2 Position and Interpretation
To gain a sense of the legal dilemma within the modern Egyptian legal system,
which is hybrid in nature and suspended between modernity and traditionalism,
the second constitutional article is a very good start. In the current constitution of
Egypt,88 Article 2 states that “Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic its official
language, and the principles of Islamic sharia’a are the principal (major) source
of legislation”. This article was inserted into the Egyptian Constitution for historic,
political and cultural reasons, and since its inclusion has generated additional
ambiguity in the application of the law.
This chapter begins with a brief historical background on the adoption of Article
2. Then, an overview of the judicial decrees emanating from this constitutional
article from both the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation,
and a hint at parliamentary and political positions from it is given. The chapter
concludes with an analysis of the uncertainty created by inclusion of the Article 2
in the Egyptian legal system.
A. The Historical Background On The Adoption Of Article 2:
Since the modernization of the Egyptian legal system, endless negotiations about
the identity of that new legal system and the position of Islam and sharia’a within
it has ensued. Western interference in Egypt, because of economic interests,
increased the influence of modern European laws especially French and British.
By 1882, British colonization had settled officially in Egypt as a controlling
authority. The colonial authority worked on accelerating the creation of
bureaucratic and modern state authorities. In 1883, legal decrees substituted for
the 1882 constitution which had only been recently created prior to the British
invasion. Attempts at changing the identity of the state from an Islamic province
under the Ottoman state into a British province were clear. This change was
neither popular nor readily accepted by Egyptian society, who looked at the
British as both foreign and non-Muslim who threatened their new national
identity.
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By 1917, members of the Egyptian political and cultural elite claimed the right to
represent the Egyptian people before the League of Nations to promote selfdetermination. The claim of self-determination was not accepted by the British
government, which lead to oppression of the political group known as al-Wafd or
the Delegation.89 The al-Wafd group consisted mainly of legal figures such as
lawyers Saa’d Zaghloul, Ahmed Lotfy El-Sayed, and Abdul-Aziz Fahmy, who
later became a judge and the first head of the Court of Cassation. It was soon
clear that this group was comprised merely of law professionals, who had a new
liberal vision about the relationship between the state and the people.
After the rejection of the independence claims, Egyptians began resisting
colonialism culminating in the 1919 Revolution. This movement favored Egyptian
nationalism consistent with an Islamic religious identity. Accordingly Christians
and women participated in this Revolution on nationalist grounds. After declaring
independence from Britain in 1922, a call for a new constitution was raised, and
accepted by King Fouad.
1. 1923 Constitution Position From Islamic Sharia’a: Article
149
The Egyptian elite claimed to have a modern liberal constitution like that of
European nations. Accordingly the king of Egypt, Fouad, under pressure,
accepted the formulation of a committee to write this constitution. In 1923 the
constitution was created and signed by the king; it was the first operational
constitution in Egypt.90
Article 149 of the 1923 Constitution stated that “Islam is the religion of the state,
and Arabic language is the official language.” This article was agreed upon by
the formulating committee with no objections, even from its non-Muslim
members. It shifted state identity from being an informal understanding to the
highest and most formal legal document. Article 149 was an attempt to place the
issue of the Islamicity of the state alongside its nationality, through the same
hybrid model of thinking which joined modernity with Islamicity. Essentially, Egypt
was a state in the modern sense, but identified with Islam. This Article was
89
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maintained in the subsequent Egyptian Constitutions of 1930, 1956 and 1964.
While the Constitutions of 1923 and 1930 were adopted through a royal decree
with no referendum, the 1956 Constitution was adopted by referendum under
Nasser’s authority; and the 1964 Constitution was declared by presidential
decree as a temporary constitution after the dissolution of the Arab Republic - the
union between Egypt and Syria. Only the 1958 Constitution, which was the Arab
Republic temporary Constitution, ignored article 149. There was no clear
outcome from adopting Article 149 in any of these constitutions, or even in its
omission in the 1958 constitution.
2. 1971 Constitution To The Current 2012 Constitution Which
was Broadly Amended In the 2014 Referendum

The 1971 Constitution included the same article number 149 in the 1923
Constitution, placing it as the second article of the new constitution, and
modifying it with the addition of the words “and the Islamic sharia’a is a principal
source of its legislation.”
Some analysts claim that this new wording was connected to the political tension
existing between leftists groups who favored Nasserist policies and President
Sadat whose policies were considered to be against state socialism. Due to this
tension, Sadat tried to deal with Islamic religious groups, who were oppressed
under Nasser’s authority, by supporting them against leftists. Part of that deal
was the modification of Article number 149 to include Islamic principles as a main
source of legislation.91Egyptian authorities depended on Islamic groups to
support, justify and popularize state decisions. This support was based on claims
of the Islamicity of the Egyptian state, society and regime. Even Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat was called a president of faith.
Tension between the Islamic movements and the state cannot be isolated from
the nature of decisions taken by the state. For example, Islamic movements did
not show support for the historic peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. On the
contrary, in 1980 they supported the presidential referendum amending Article 2
to state that “the principles of Islamic sharia’a are the principal source of
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legislation.”92 This emphasis on Islamic sharia’a principles was interpreted by
political groups as transforming the modern legal system into one inspired by
Islamic sharia’a in all respects. Tragically, Sadat was assassinated by one of the
Islamic extremist groups at the end of 1980, which disallowed him from benefiting
from that deal amending Article 77.93
B. Interpretation of Article 2:
The amendment of Article 2, in 1980 led to questions about the new meaning
and application of Islamic sharia’a within the legal system. This was interpreted
differently by politicians in the Egyptian parliament, Court of Cassation and
Supreme Constitutional Court.

1. Political Point Of View In The Egyptian Parliament
Some parliamentary figures, especially with Islamic affiliations, such as Mumtaz
Nassar, believed that this amendment to article 2 should be followed by more
extensive revisions of legal texts to ensure the application of Islamic sharia’a.
Accordingly, parliament saw additional proposals for new Islamic codes, but
these new codes were never realized.94
Rifat Mahjub, the head of the People’s Assembly in 1985, tried to re-open the
debate on Islamic codes that had been prepared by the preceding assembly
under Sufi Abu-Talib, but the governing party, the National Democratic Party,
rejected by a majority such a motion and thus ending it for all.95
The official religious institutions represented by U’lama’ Al-Azhar, surprisingly
proposed action against the government’s position regarding the interpretation
and application of the new constitutional article. They claimed that the
government was not serious about applying the new constitutional text, and thus
denied the direct application of Islamic sharia’a. In the end, they also failed to
impose their understanding of sharia’a on state authorities. 96
In the end, neither the political nor religious institutions’ position was able to
resolve the legal issue surrounding the application of Article 2 in the legal
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system. It was more connected to the sense of Islamic nationalism than actual
legal practice.
2. The Court Of Cassation Interpretation of Article 2
It is important to begin a discussion of Court of Cassation’s interpretation of
article 2, in recognizing it as the highest juridical entity in the Egyptian judicial
system since its creation in the first half of the twentieth century. Accordingly, the
Court of Cassation was entitled, in general, to interpret laws and exercise its
authority over claims of unconstitutionality. But due to the absence of legal
procedures to decide the unconstitutionality, the Court of Cassation did not
exceed its interpretation authority. By the 1970s, the Supreme Court challenged
the legal texts as being unconstitutional, succeeded by the Supreme
Constitutional Court in 1979. During the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the
jurisdiction of both the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Constitutional Court
over interpreting constitutional texts remained unclear.
When considering the position of the Court of Cassation during the period
following the 1980’s amendment of article 2, a lot of Islamist lawyers, who were
supported by a number of judges, raised court motions claiming the
unconstitutionality of laws in accordance with Article 2. In response, judges
stopped deciding those cases, and referred them to the Supreme Constitutional
Court to address first the unconstitutionality claims. 97
Some of these claims of unconstitutionality reached the Court of Cassation,
which found itself obliged to make a decision. In Cassation Appeal no. 7846 for
the judicial year no. 58, a claim regarding the application of article no. 7 in the
Egyptian penal code was raised. Article no. 7 in the Egyptian penal code states
that “Penal law shall not diminish the personal rights in accordance with Islamic
sharia’a. “98 The plaintiff claimed the right of the accused to punish his family
members in accordance with Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution and Article 7
of penal code, claiming that the court’s decision of imprisonment was based on a
misinterpretation of constitutional Article 2.

Accordingly, the Court of Cassation was entitled to respond to such a claim. The
problem encountered by the Court was that there was no precedent
97
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interpretation of Article 2 by the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Constitutional
Court. The Court of Cassation held the duty to interpret Article 2 for the first time
after the amendment of 1980. It stated in its verdict of 18 January 1990 that
Article 2 is just an opportunity for the legislator to consider Islamic sharia’a, with
no further obligation on the Egyptian courts to apply sharia’a:
Article 2 of Egyptian constitution about considering Islamic sharia’a as
the principal source of legislation is an invitation for the legislator to
ensure the application of Islamic sharia’a in the laws issued through its
authority […] and it should be represented within legal texts issued
through legislative authority to be executed by judicial authorities…
Accordingly Islamic sharia’a shouldn’t be applied by the essence of
article 2, in itself, unless legislative authority stated it into laws.99

In this court decision, the Court of Cassation considered Article 2 as an invitation
for the legislator to apply Islamic sharia’a. The Court of Cassation supported the
application of legal texts over Islamic sharia’a principles, deciding that the only
way to apply sharia’a was through adoption of it through legislation.
In another case, Cassation Appeal no. 1089 of the judicial year no. 57, the Court
of Cassation forfeited deciding a claim of unconstitutionality of a civil code article.
The claim was in regards to Article 226 of the civil code which allowed up to four
percent interest on the payment of debts. The plaintiff claimed contradiction
between this article and Islamic sharia’a and Article 2. On the 8th of January
1990, the Court of Cassation issued its verdict. Similar to the Supreme
Constitutional Court position, it stated that legislation prior to the adoption of the
new Article 2 was valid and applicable. It rejected the claims of unconstitutionality
of these laws as the new Article 2 should be applied to legislation only by giving
the legislator a chance to amend older legislation.100
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Surprisingly, the Court of Cassation assumed a different position in Cassation
Appeal no. 1800 for the juridical year no 61. It analyzed Article 29 of lease law
no. 49 for the year 1977, on the Islamicity claim. The Court interpreted lease
contracts based on fiqh and sharia’a, justifying the application of the legal text as
not contradicting Islamic sharia’a as follows:
[…] the second article of constitution stated that “the principles of Islamic
sharia’a are the principal source of legislation’, and as article no. 29 of
law no. 1977 regarding leasing places stated that among beneficiaries of
the article, including the lessee parents, the condition of keep staying
within the leased unit by the original lessee till death or acquittal, and
what is meant by staying in this legal context is the staying for a legal
cause with no contradiction with Islamic sharia’a rulings.101
Apparently, the Court of Cassation in this ruling extended interpretation of legal
texts through an understanding of Islamic sharia’a. But it was not the final
position of the Court. It would be influenced by a later interpretation of a decision
by the Supreme Constitutional Court reinterpreting Article 2 on new grounds.102
The Court of Cassation declared its commitment to principles of Islamic sharia’a
which are certain in authenticity and meaning as being notable in its verdict:
[A]s this court followed its stable jurisdiction, [that applying article 2 of the
Egyptian constitution], it may not be issued any legal text under its
jurisdiction that violate the decisive certain rules of Islamic sharia’a, that
is certain in authenticity and meaning, because of such certainty Ijtihad is
forbidden as such certain rules of Islamic sharia’a represent its essence
that could not be changed nor reinterpreted, But other rules of Islamic
sharia’a that is not certain in its authenticity or meaning, are allowed for

 والقول بغير ذلك يؤدى إلى الخلط بين التزام القضاء بتطبيق القانون الوضعي وبين إشتراع القواعد،لسريانها
 ويؤكد هذا النظر أنه لما كان الدستور المصري قد حدد السلطات الدستورية،القانونية التي تتأبى مع حدود واليته
وأوضح اختصاص كل منها وكان الفصل بين السلطات هو قوام النظام الدستوري مما الزمه أنه ال يجوز إلحداها أن
 وكانت وظيفة السلطة القضائية وفق أحكامه تطبيق القوانين،تجاوز ما قرره الدستور بإعتباره القانون األسمى
ً  وفض،السارية فإنه يتعين عليها إعمال أحكامها
 من الدستور تنص على أن كل ما قررته191 ال عن ذلك فإن المادة
ًالقوانين واللوائح من أحكام قبل صدور هذا الدستور يبقى صحيحاً ونافذ ًا ومع ذلك يجوز إلغاؤها أو تعديلها وفقا
"للقواعد واإلجراءات المقررة في هذا الدستور
ومن ث م فإنه ال مجال هنا للتحدي بأحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية ما دام أن السلطة التشريعية لم تقنن مبادئها في تشريع
 برفض دعوى عدم دستورية نص1985/5/4وضعي لما كان ذلك وكانت المحكمة الدستورية العليا قد قضت بجلسة
 وإذ جرى قضاء الحكم،1985/5/16  من القانون المدني ونشر هذا الحكم في الجريدة الرسمية بتاريخ226 المادة
 من القانون227 ،226 المطعون فيه رغم ذلك على تأييد الحكم المستأنف فيما انتهى إليه من إهدار لنص المادتين
 فإنه يكون قد،خالف “المدني لتعارضهما مع أحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية التي اعتبرها الدستور مصدر ًا رئيسياً للتشريع
القانون وأخطأ في تطبيقه
101See

Appeal no. 1800 for the Juridical year 61, Court of Cassation,12th of April
1998, vol.49, at 306: “ مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية............." المادة الثانية من الدستور قد نصت على أن
 بشأن إيجار األماكن1977  لسنة49  من القانون29  وتشترط الفقرة األولى من المادة،"المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع

 اإلقامة الدائمة المستقرة بالعين المؤجرة من- فيمن عددتهم من المستفيدين بميزة االمتداد القانوني ومن بينهم الوالدان
 والمقصود باإلقامة في هذا المعنى اإلقامة المستندة إلى مسوغ قانوني ال،المستأجر األصلي حتى الوفاة أو الترك
”يخالف أحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية.
102
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ijtihad process…[ as it is allowed] it will be allowed for wali al-amr for the
beneficiary of society103
The Court here referred to several terms representing a new understanding by
the Court of Cassation of Article 2, and sharia’a. The state is considered as waly
al-amr or the governor, in the Islamic context, and is entitled to do Ijtihad through
courts and legislative authorities. The areas of Ijtihad, according to that verdict,
are the uncertain areas of Islamic sharia’a whether its authenticity or meaning.
Those uncertain areas were not identified by the verdicts of the Court of
Cassation but rather through the Supreme Constitutional Court.
3. Supreme Constitutional Court Interpretation Of Article 2:
The Supreme Constitutional Court, which was established to substitute for the
Supreme Court through law no. 48 for 1979,104 is entitled to conduct judicial
monitoring of the constitutionality of jurisdictions and regulations, to decide on
court jurisdiction competency amongst different judicial authorities, and to decide
the validity of judicial verdicts in event of the existence of two contradicting
judicial verdicts from different judicial organs regarding the same issue. 105 Law
no. 48 of 1979 never stated clearly the authority of the court to interpret the
constitution articles in themselves, but it was understood from the legal
jurisdiction that it required interpretation of the constitutional article before
deciding on the constitutional claims.
a. First

Interpretation

of

Article

2

Before

The

Amendment Of 1980:
Under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the 1970s, questions of
constitutionality arose regarding the second article of the Constitution. Article 2
before its 1980 amendment stated that “Islamic sharia’a is a principal source of
legislation.” The Supreme Court in its 1976 verdict interpreted the second

103See

Appeal no. 70 for the Juridical year 18, Supreme Constitutional Court, 3rd
of November 2002, vol.10, at 682: “ ذلك أن النص في المادة الثانية من الدستور بعد تعديلها في عام

 وعلى ما جرى عليه قضاء هذه، يدل،" على أن "مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع1980
 على أنه ال يجوز لنص تشريعي يصدر في ظله أن يناقض األحكام الشرعية القطعية في ثبوتها وداللتها،المحكمة
 بإعتبار أن هذه األحكام وحدها هي التي يمتنع اإلجتهاد فيها ألنها تمثل من الشريعة اإلسالمية ثوابتها التي ال،معا
 فإن باب اإلجتهاد يتسع فيها، أما األحكام غير القطعية في ثبوتها وداللتها أو فيهما معا،تحتمل تأويال أو تبديال
 وهو اجتهاد إن كان جائزا ومندوبا من أهل، وتطور الحياة وتنوع مصالح العباد،لمواجهة تغير الزمان والمكان
 فهو في ذلك أو جب وأولى لولى األمر ليواجه ما تقتضيه مصلحة الجماعة درءا لمفسدة أو جلبا لمنفعة أو درءا،الفقه
وجلبا لألمرين معا.”
104

The decree of law no. 48 for 1979 replaced the Supreme Court law issued by
1970, transferring all the claims of constitutionality to the new supreme
constitutional court. Revise the introductory clause of law no. 48 for 1979.
105 Article 25 of Law no. 48 for 1979.
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constitutional article as an invitation for the legislative authority to choose among
any of the different Islamic schools, as all Islamic schools are equal to each
other. There was no obligation to follow a certain opinion or school. The Supreme
Court considered Article 280 of the Sharia’a courts law, which stated that judges
are obliged to follow the opinions of the Hanafite School only, as limiting the
scope of ijtihad and Islamic sharia’a and contradicting with Article 2. 106
Accordingly, it was understood that the Supreme Court rejected Article 280 which
limited the authority of judges to do takhayur, considering it against Article 2 and
legislative purposes.
b.Second Interpretation To Article 2
Amendment Of 1980 And Before 1985

After

The

The Supreme Constitutional Court, which was established in 1979, was obliged
to confront Article 2 after its amendment in the 1980s referendum. The new
article emphasized the application of Islamic sharia’a by finding it as “the
principal source of legislation.” It was controversial in that it changed the
understanding of the Supreme Constitutional Court from its predecessor court.
This policy of supporting takhayur which was directed at sharia’a courts and
family disputes, coincided with the legislative philosophy of Sanhuri and the new
modern legal system as represented by the verdict of the Supreme Court in
1976. The new Supreme Constitutional Court, however, tried from the beginning
to evade direct interpretation of the new article.
In 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court issued verdicts regarding two cases,
deciding on claims of unconstitutionality against doctrines, based on the new
version of Article 2. The first case involved a challenge to a civil law that allowed
creditors to charge interest on overdue accounts. The second case concerned a

106See

Appeal no. 10 for the Juridical year 5, The Supreme Court, 3rd of July
ً من حيث أن المدعية تنعى على هذه المادة أو
1976, available at http://hccourt.gov.eg/ , “ ال مخالفة

نصين من الدستور أولهما نص المادة الثانية التى تنص على أن "اإلسالم دين الدولة ومبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية
مصدر رئيسى للتشريع" والثانى نص الفقرة األولى من المادة التاسعة منه التى تنص على أن " األسرة أساس
 أن المادة الثانية من الدستور إذ نصت: الوجه األول-:المجتمع قوامها الدين واألخالق والوطنية" وذلك لألوجه اآلتية
 فإنها تعنى توجيه المشرع إلى أحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية،على أن مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية مصدر رئيسى للتشريع
 دون التقيد بمذهب معين من تلك المذاهب أو بأرجح األقوال،كمصدر كلى ينتظم كافة المذاهب الفقهية على السواء
 ) من الئحة ترتيب المحاكم الشرعية قد نصت على إلزام القضاء التقيد بأرجح األقوال280(  وإذ كانت المادة،فيها
 وكان هذا التقييد مما ال يملكه ولى األمر فإنها تكون قد خالفت المادة الثانية من،من مذهب أبى حنيفة دون سواه
 أن إلزام القضاء التقيد بمذهب معين من مذاهب الشريعة اإلسالمية من شأنه إغالق باب: ال وجه الثانى.الدستور
 مع أن االجتهاد واجب على أهل كل زمان،االجتهاد وتجميد الشريعة السمحاء.”
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challenge to a 1979 family law article that increased women’s rights in divorce
proceedings.
In these two decisions, the Court’s interpretation of Article 2 was illogical. The
Supreme Constitutional Court declared that both cases were non-justiciable. It
stated that as the challenged articles were issued prior to the new amendment of
the constitution, and that according to the merits of the committee issuing the
amendment, Article 2 should be applied to subsequent laws. The challenge
against those articles were out of the court’s jurisdiction. However, the minutes of
the constitutional committee referred to the amendment within a time frame for
the legislative organ to revise the legislation. The Supreme Constitutional Court
decided to refute its own powers of challenging the law with these two verdicts
and five years after the amendment’s adoption.107
In both case no. 20 of Judicial Year 1, May 4, 1985, and case no. 28 of Judicial
Year 2, May 4, 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court strictly rejected
challenges of constitutionality. But the Supreme Constitutional Court in case no.
20 of Judicial year 1 criticized the family law, which was popularly known as
Jihan’s law, because it was issued through the exceptional authorities of the
presidency under emergency law. The court considered such an amendment of
family law as non-urgent and to be declared by the single authority of the
president. It also referred to the new amendment as contradicting general Islamic
principles. Due to its issuance prior to the amendment of Article 2, the challenge
was declared not-justiciable.
In case No.28 of Judicial year 2, the Court followed the same rule of forfeiting the
challenge as the challenged text was older than the amendment. The court
stated that the 1980 amendment obliged the legislator to only depend on Islamic
sharia’a sources and to choose among the different opinions of its schools –
takhayur- with no right to depend on other sources; and in the event of the
absence of equivalent jurisdiction in Islamic sharia’a, Ijtihad was allowed through
the legal thinking of Islamic schools. The court emphasized the necessity of
giving the legislative authority time to revise legislation and issue new Islamic
laws, and at the same time it affirmed the absence of the court’s authority to

107

Supra note 91.
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review the constitutionality of the civil code article which was issued in 1949 and
108

prior to the new constitutional article.

c. Third Interpretation Of Article 2 : Case No.7 Of
Judicial Year 8 (May 15, 1993),
In 1993, the Supreme Constitutional Court exercised its authority in interpreting
the controversial second constitutional article. According to the Supreme
Constitutional Court, the search through Islamic law heritage lead to classifying
108See

Appeal no.28 for the Judicial year 2, Supreme Constitutional Court, 4th of
May
1985,
available
at:
وحيث إن المدعى “ http://hccourt.gov.eg/Pages/Rules/Rules_Search.aspx#rule_text_1,

بصفته ينعى على نص المادة ( ) 226من القانون المدنى أنها إذ تقضى باستحقاق فوائد محددة القدر عن مجرد
التأخر فى الوفاء باإللتزام النقدى تكون قد انطوت على مخالفة لمبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية التى أصبحت طبقاً للمادة
وذلك بإعتبار أن تلك الفوائد تمثل زيادة فى الدين بغير مقابل ،فهى الثانية من الدستور "المصدر الرئيسى للتشريع".
الربا المتفق على تحريمه أخذ ًا بقوله تعالى "وأحل هللا البيع وحرم الربا" وهو من األحكام الشرعية المقطوع بها ثبوتاً
وداللة والتى أصبحت بموجب المادة الثانية من الدستور فى مصاف القواعد القانونية الوضعية التى من شأنها نسخ
ما كان سابقاً عليها متعارضاً معها من نصوص التشريعات الوضعية نسخاً ضمنياً ،إذ صارت بذاتها واجبة األعمال
دون حاجة إلى صدور تشريع يقننها .وحيث إن القانون المدنى الصادر بالقانون رقم  131لسنة  1948فى  16يوليو
سنة  1948والمعمول به إبتداء من  15أكتوبر سنة  1949ينص فى المادة ( )226منه -محل الطعن -على أنه "إذا
كان محل اإللتزام مبلغاً من النقود ،وكان معلوم المقدار وقت الطلب وتأخر المدين فى الوفاء به ،كان ملزماً بأن يدفع
للدائن على سبيل التعويض عن التأخر فوائد قدرها أربعة فى المائة فى المسائل المدنية و خمسة فى المائة فى
المسائل التجارية  .وتسرى هذه الفوائد من تاريخ المطالبة القضائية بها ،ان لم يحدد االتفاق أو العرف التجارى
تاريخاً آخر لسريانها ،وهذا كله ما لم ينص القانون على غيره" .وحيث إنه يبين من تعديل الدستور الذى تم بتاريخ
 22مايو سنة  1980أن المادة الثانية أصبحت تنص على أن "اإلسالم دين الدولة ،واللغة العربية لغتها الرسمية،
ومبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية المصدر الرئيسى للتشريع" .بعد أن كانت تنص عند صدور الدستور فى  11سبتمبر سنة
 1971على أن "اإلسالم دين الدولة ،واللغة العربية لغتها الرسمية ،ومبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية مصدر رئيسى
للتشريع" والعبارة األخيرة من هذا النص لم يكن لها سابقة فى أى من الدساتير المصرية المتعاقبة إبتداء ًا من دستور
 1923وحتى دستور سنة  ...1964إن المشرع الدستورى أتى بقيد على السلطة المختصة بالتشريع قوامه إلزام هذه
السلطة -وهى بصدد وضع التشريعات -باإللتجاء إلى مبادئ الشريعة الستمداد األحكام المنظمة للمجتمع ،وهو ما
أشارت إليه اللجنة الخاصة باإلعداد لتعديل الدستور فى تقريرها إلى مجلس الشعب والذى أقره المجلس بجلسة 19
يولية سنة  1979وأكدته اللجنة التى أعدت مشروع التعديل وقدمته إلى المجلس فناقشه ووافق عليه بجلسة 30
إبريل سنة  1980إذ جاء فى تقريرها عن مقاصد تعديل الدستور بالنسبة للعبارة األخيرة من المادة الثانية بانها "تلزم
المشرع بااللتجاء إ لى أحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية للبحث عن بغيته فيها مع إلزامه بعدم االلتجاء إلى غيرها ،فإذا لم
يجد فى الشريعة اإلسالمية حكماً صريحاً ،فإن وسائل استنباط األحكام من المصادر االجتهادية فى الشريعة
اإلسالمية تمكن المشرع من التوصل إلى األحكام الالزمة والتى ال تخالف األصول والمبادئ العامة للشريعة" .ولما
كان مفاد ما تقدم ،أن سلطة التشريع إعتبار ًا من تاريخ العمل بتعديل العبارة األخيرة من المادة الثانية من الدستور فى
 22مايو سنة  -1980أصبحت مقيدة فيما تسنه من تشريعات مستحدثه أو معدله لتشريعات سابقة على هذا التاريخ،
بمراعا ة أن تكون هذه التشريعات متفقة مع مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية  ...وحيث إن إعمال المادة الثانية من الدستور
بعد تعديلها -على ما تقدم بيانه ،وإن كان مؤداه :إلزام المشرع بأتخاذ مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية المصدر الرئيسى لما
يضعه من تشريعات بعد التاريخ الذى فرض هذا اإللزام بما يترتب عليه من إعتباره مخالفاً للدستور إذا لم يلتزم
بذلك القيد ،إال أن قصر هذا اإللزام على تلك التشريعات ال يعنى اعفاء المشرع من تبعة االبقاء على التشريعات
السابقة -رغم ما قد يشوبها من تعارض مع مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية ،وإنما يلقى على عاتقه من الناحية السياسية
مسئولية المبادره إلى تنقيه نصوص هذة التشريعات من أية مخالفة للمبادئ سالفة الذكر ،تحقيقاً لإلتساق بينها وبين
التشريعات الال حقة فى وجوب اتفاقها جميعاً مع هذه المبادئ وعدم الخروج عليها .وحيث إنه ترتيباً على ما تقدم،
ولما كان مبنى الطعن مخالفة المادة ( )226من القانون المدنى للمادة الثانية من الدستور تأسيساً على أن فوائد
التأخير المستحقة بموجبها تعد من الربا المحرم شرعاً طبقاً لمبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية التى جعلتها المادة الثانية من
الدستور المصدر الرئيسى للتشريع ،وإذ كان القيد المقرر بمقتضى هذه المادة  -بعد تعديلها بتاريخ  22مايو سنة
 1980والمتضمن إلزام المشرع بعدم مخالفة الشريعة اإلسالمية -ال يتأتى أعما له بالنسبة للتشريعات السابقة عليه
حسبما سلف بيانه ،وكانت المادة ( )226من القانون المدنى الصادر سنة  1948لم يلحقها أى تعديل بعد التاريخ
المشار إليه ،ومن ثم ،فإن النعى عليها ،وحالتها هذه  -بمخالفة حكم المادة الثانية من الدستور وأياً كان وجه الرأى فى
”.تعارضها مع مبادئ الشريعة اإلسالمية  -يكون فى غير محله .األمر الذى يتعين معه الحكم برفض الدعوى
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Islamic sharia’a rules into two types of sharia’a: certain and uncertain. The Court
defined the certain rules of sharia’a as being the binding rules for all Muslims,
and the uncertain rules derived through ijtihad as not binding. The court
mentioned the necessity of identifying those certain rules of sharia’a, so
legislative work could be practiced without contradicting them. If there were no
certain rules of sharia’a, legislators must then perform ijtihad and devise laws.
The Court referred to the state as the wali al-amr or the governor, which is a form
of al-syasa al-shara’ya theory from traditional Islamic fiqh, especially from Ibn
Taimia’s ideas, to allow state wider authority in legislating.109 According to the
courts verdict, the state is entitled, as wali al-amr, to choose the appropriate rule
to be applied either through certain rules of sharia’a or through implementing
Ijtihad to formulate rules in the uncertain area. The only barrier before the state is
its obligation not to contradict the certain rules of sharia’a. So according to Article
2, the principles of Islamic sharia’a that the state is required to apply is through
Ijtihad. The state is entitled to do takhayur from Islamic schools’ opinions to be
stated within its laws. There is no problem to do talfiq as long as each part of the
law had its origins in Islamic heritage and the outcome does not contradict
certain areas of sharia’a. The Court also identified its role then as a reviser and
ensurer of laws to ensure that certain areas of sharia’a did not contradict; it had
no authority over legislation regarding the issuing of laws through Ijtihad in other
uncertain areas.
According to the Supreme Constitutional Court verdict in case No.7, the certain
sharia’a area is characterized by absolute clarity in authenticity and meaning. To
be clearly authentic, there should be no doubt about the religious text
authenticity. The required certainty of meaning requires the agreement of all
Islamic jurists on the meaning of the text, which is almost impossible. Indirectly,
the court is stating both conditions together to evade the Qur’anic texts, which
are declared by the court as being authentic in wording but with meaning varying
among Islamic schools. The Prophet’s sayings or hadiths are not on the same
level of obligation as the Qur’anic text which open the jtihad’s. Accordingly, the
only way to evade the clear application of Qur’anic text is requiring the certainty
of its meaning. The Supreme Constitutional Court required proof of such certainty
of meaning with the agreement of all Islamic jurists on the same meaning. This is
almost impossible to achieve and narrows the applicable sharia’a to a few cases.

109

Supra note 91, at 213- 227.
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Case no. 7 concerns the claim of unconstitutionality regarding the right of
mothers to child custody till the age of ten for boys and the age of twelve for girls,
as stated in law no 25 of 1929 as amended by law no. 100 of 1985. 110 While the
mother’s party claimed its right to custody till the maximum limit as stated by law,
the husband’s party claimed that this age limit contradicted the Hanafite School
which is the dominant school of personal status law in Egypt, 111 and contradicts
Article 2. The court sent the question of its constitutionality to the Supreme
Constitutional Court.
According to the new perception of sharia’a by the Supreme Constitutional Court
and the meaning of Article 2 of the constitution as being an application of certain
rules of Islamic sharia’a, the Court decided that there was no Qur’anic or other
text that is certain in its meaning and authenticity to determine the age for
hadana or child custody as the age of the hadana or custodian is determined
through the Ijtihad of different schools. The State is not obliged to determine a
certain range of age using any of these schools, but contrarily the state has the
duty to conduct Ijtihad to determine that the age is in accordance with societal
and children’s interests. 112 The Court also hinted at the legal custodian age as
being in conformity with one of the Maliki school’s opinions. In its decision, the
Court considered the challenge of unconstitutionality as invalid and rejected that
claim.
C. Sharia’a Application has Lead To Uncertainty Of Legal Practice:
Article 2 has troubled the Egyptian legal system, as it complicates the legal
hybridity differentiating it from Sanhuri’s, Abdou’s and others’ ideas. It obliges
that all legislation follow the main principles of Islamic sharia’a, with no clear
definition of what the Islamic sharia’a principles actually are, and with no
consideration of those laws inspired by Western legislation. Egyptian high courts,
especially the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Constitutional Court hold the
responsibility for defining the article. The Supreme Administrative Court has also
had a role in interpreting the second article similarly to both the Constitutional
and Cassation Courts.113

110

Supra note 91, at 191, (This amendment was issued in law no. 44 of 1979,
which was named publicly as Jihan’s law, the law was reissued in a new format
of law no. 100 of 1985).
111 Supra notes 4 and 91.
112 Supra notes 4 and 91.
113 Supra note 91.
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The main actions of the courts reflect ignorance of the constitutional amendment
of 1980. Some authors saw it as being politically motivated, but further analysis
of the judicial decisions reflect judicial confusion. The judicial authority in general
and the legal community in particular did not fully understand how the legal
system could work after the amendments. It was understood that laws, as parts
of a modern legal system, created a lot of duties and rights in accordance with
these texts. Thus, any change to one of the Islamic sharia’a rules would change
the paradigm and require clarification of the new legal rule, its source and
formation. The second point of confusion was the mechanism for choosing
sharia’a schools, whether through choosing a particular school or the common
takhayur and talfiq of the modernist idea.
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The Supreme Constitutional Court in its verdict of case No. 7 in 1993 worked on
solving that problem by finding a new analysis of the text. The simplicity of that
verdict in defining Islamic sharia’a principles was based on the classification of
certain sharia’a principles versus uncertain sharia’a principles. This classification
by the Court was based on the Islamic theory of al-syasa al-shara’ya in
accordance with Ibn Taimia’s ideas about the authority of the wali al-amr, or the
state, in issuing legislation.
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Ibn Taimia’s ideas are based on the authority of the wali al-amr or the governor
to conclude legal rules over the Muslim community in order to achieve the
purposes of sharia’a, with no obligation to follow the merits or rules of any of the
Islamic schools. The only obligation of the wali al-amr was to not contradict the
recognized aspects of sharia’a by all schools. 116
The Constitutional Court decided that the state had its own authority to choose
among the Islamic schools as wali al-amr, and accordingly it allowed for the state
to conclude its own decisions as long as it was far from the certain areas in
Islamic sharia’a. The Supreme Constitutional Court’s position looks similar to that
of Sanhuri’s, but it denied as well, the state’s right to include laws from sources
other than sharia’a as long as there was no clear root in sharia’a. In such a case,
the state was obliged to do Ijtihad to reach a new rule consistent with sharia’a
opinions and purposes.117
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Supra notes 3 and 91.
Supra note 3.
116 Supra notes 3 and 6.
117 Supra notes 3 and 6.
115
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It is clear that the new understanding of Islamic sharia’a is not popular among
legal professionals and politicians. Until today, there is a debate about the
effectiveness of Article 2 in applying Islamic sharia’a. That is why Islamic parties
after the 25th of January Uprising have tried to promote the application of Islamic
sharia’a in a more conservative manner.
In the 2012 Constitution, a new article was adopted, number 219, which stated
that “The principles of Islamic sharia’a include general evidence, foundational
rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines
and by the larger community.” The new article was an attempt to widen the scope
of application of Islamic sharia’a by stating the general evidence, foundational
rules and rules of jurisprudence. But at the same time, there is a restriction to
only Sunni schools in Islamic sharia’a. This article was omitted after the broad
amendments to the 2012 constitution after the ouster of the Islamic party in
2014.118
D. Conclusion:
The uncertainty of the Egyptian legal system due to its hybrid nature - between
modernity and Islamic sharia’a - is clearly seen through the application of
Constitutional Article 2. This controversial article that was first introduced in the
legal system in the 1971 Constitution has continued up to the new Constitution
and its amendment in 2014.
The Court of Cassation has passed through several stages in dealing with this
article including ignoring it or by shifting its duty to the legislative authority. But
some verdicts of the Court of Cassation have tried to identify what is Islamic and
what is non- Islamic either as a criticism of the legal text or as an interpretation of
it. In the end, the Court of Cassation followed the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Constitutional Court in classifying the Islamic sharia’a into certain and uncertain
areas to identify the applicable rules.
The Supreme Constitutional Court which tried to ignore the new amendment in
the beginning, lived up to its role in the historic decision of case no.7 in the
judicial year 8. In this verdict the Supreme Constitutional Court defined Islamic
sharia’a and its role in identifying the Islamic principles that should be followed by
the legislative authority. It established a new theory of Islamic law under the
118

See supra note 88, it may be considered that the amendment of 2014 is an
establishment of a new constitution, that the amendment was very wide to
include nearly the whole constitutional order of 2012.
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takhayur and talfiq principles as proposed by Sanhuri and Abdou. It widened the
scope of legislative authority to do Ijtihad as long as there is no certain text to
follow, and limited the sphere of certain texts by ensuring the certainty on both
authenticity and meaning through all jurists’ consensus and Islamic schools.
The new application of Article 2 in the Egyptian legal system created a lot of
uncertainty and ambiguity that have worked as a trap for Egyptian courts. Even
after the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court in defining the meaning of
Article 2, some legal and political parties saw the Supreme Constitutional Court
as escaping from its duty to apply the essence of Article 2. There has been an
attempt to force the state to follow more the traditional opinions by adding a new
article to the Constitution. All of these attempts lack real vision in interpreting the
legal rule practice through Islamic sharia’a which has been uncertain since its
original application. None of the new visions solve the problem of the multijurisdiction nature of Islamic schools except through reference to Sanhuri’s ideas,
or to Ibn Taimia’s theory of al-syasa al-shara’ya.
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V. Criminal Application Of Islamic Sharia’a Under Article 60 Of The
Egyptian Penal Code
The Egyptian penal code was adopted in 1937 as a product of the modernization
movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. The most notable thing
about the penal code is that it has maintained its hybrid nature combining
modernity and traditionalism. While modern legal systems are positive in their
core beliefs that punishment is not the sole purpose, in and of itself, but is rather
a tool for rehabilitation of the criminal,119 the Egyptian legal system combined
deterrence

and

rehabilitation

as

goals

of

punishment. The

Supreme

Constitutional Court stated clearly in its verdicts that the main goal of the
punishment is the personal deterrence of the criminal. 120 Accordingly, the jails
and prisons were identified as rehabilitation centers in the constitutional article
no. 56,121 but the work of the penal and criminal codes still focus on deterrence
and revenge.
An understanding of this penal system is important through exploring the Islamic
criminal system which has affected the formulation of the current criminal system.
Through tracking Article 60 of the Penal Code and how it has been interpreted by
courts, an understanding of the problem of the uncertainty of Islamic sharia’a
application in a hybrid system is revealed.
A. The Nature Of Punishment In The Islamic Legal System
The Islamic legal system is based on the divine nature of its ruling. Punishment is
either a divine order dictated by sharia’a or based on people’s interests.
119

See, Ogechi E. Anyanwu, Crime And Justice In Postcolonial Nigeria: The
Justifications And Challenges Of Islamic Law Of Shari’ah, Vol. 21, No. 2, Journal
of Law and Religion, pp. 315-347, 326-328, (Cambridge University Press,
(2005/2006), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040588.
120 See Appeal no. 114. For the Juridical year 21, Supreme Constitutional Court,
2nd of May 2001, vol.9, page 986:

لما كان الهدف من العقوبة الجنائية هو الزجر الخاص للمجرم جزاء لما اقترف والردع العام للغير ليحمل من
 تقرر توقيع العقوبة48 يحتمل اررتكابهم الجريمة علي اإلعراض عن إتيانها وكانت الفقرة الرابعة من المادة
المقررة الرتكاب الجناية أو الجنحة محل االتفاق علي مجرد االتفاق علي اقترافها حتي ولو لم يتم ارتكابها فعال فإنها
بذلك ال تحقق ردعا وال خاصا بل إن ذلك قد يشجع المتفقين علي ارتكاب الجريمة محل االتفاق طالما أن مجرد
 االتفاق علي اقترافها سيؤدي إلي معاقبتهم بذات عقوبة ارتكابها.

Egyptian Constitution 2014, Article 56, stating that “A prison is a place of
correction and rehabilitation. Prisons and places of detention shall be subject to
judiciary supervision, where actions inconsistent with human dignity or which
endanger human health shall be prohibited. The Law shall regulate the
provisions of reform and rehabilitation of convicted persons and facilitating
decent lives after their release”. ( مادة56)  تخضع السجون وأماكن.السجن دار إصالح وتأهيل
 أو يعرض صحته، ويحظر فيها كل ما ينافى كرامة اإلنسان،للخطر االحتجاز لإلشراف القضائى. وينظم القانون
121

 وتيسير سبل الحياة الكريمة لهم بعد اإلفراج عنهم،أحكام إصالح و تأهيل المحكوم عليهم
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EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE
According to Islamic sharia’a, punishment is either hudu’d or ta’zir. The hudu’d
are punishments stated by God and as understood from the Quran. Most Islamic
schools accept that there are five hudu’d: murder, theft, fornication, specific
defamation, and ridda or apostasy.122 Islamic schools have their own opinions
and rules about the specific definition of each crime under Hudu’d and their
application, especially because hudu’d involves severe physical punishment
including the death penalty. Among the schools, there is general agreement that
hudu’d forms the core of the Islamic penal system.
Ta’zir, on the other hand, is the substitute punishment that is decided by the wali
al-amr or the governor, or al- qadi, the judge. This punishment can be for a crime
which is not covered by the Quran in hudu’d, or as a substitute for hudu’d. For
example, the Shafiite School accepts punishing thieves through ta’zir instead of
applying hadd, which is a cutting off of the hands.123 Ta’zir can be through
physical or monetary forms of punishment.
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The punishment system in Islamic sharia’a is not different from its medieval
forms of punishment, justification, and morality. Deterrence and revenge are the
main purposes of punishment within the penal system. It is based on the Qur’anic
verse which states that "We ordained therein for them: Life for a life, eye for an
eye, nose for a nose, ear for an ear, tooth for a tooth, and one wound equal to
another."125 The traditional Islamic legal system does not distinguish between
torts and crimes in the same way that the Western legal systems do. Punishment
is concentrated on revenge and deterrence, whereby tort was developed later as
a civil law issue.

126

Generally it is possible to classify other punishments in Islam such as fiscal
punishment, through paying money either for al-dya or a victim’s compensation.
Fiscal punishment can be implied for not executing decisions of the qadi,
governor or other state councils.127
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See supra note 4, at 311, 312.
Id.
124 Supra note 4, at 322, 323.
125
Quranic
Verse
no.
45
of
Surrat
Alma’eda,
available
at
http://www.oneummah.net/quran/book/5.html
126 See, Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny, Law in the Middle East, with a
foreword by Justice Robert h. Jackson, vol.1, (Origins and Development of
Islamic Law, the Middle East institute, Washington DC 1955).
127 Supra note 80.
123
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Some crimes in Islamic sharia’a are accompanied by a waiver of rights. And
there are some complementary punishments such as for those accused of
fornication not seen in other cases. 128
Also, the discretionary power of al-qadi can replace all of the previous
punishments with an admonition by the qadi. In this case, the accused receive
just verbal admonition and advice.129
There is also a spiritual purpose behind punishment in the Islamic system, which
is avoidance of divine punishment in the afterlife. Judgement day, as a part of
Islamic belief, requires a person to behave in a correct way and that includes
accepting and imposing punishments on criminals.130 Accordingly, justification of
the penal system is based on religious grounds besides revenge and deterrence.
B. The Nature Of Punishment In The Modern Legal System
Although the modern Egyptian legal system is inspired by the Western legal
system, it does not fulfill its vision about the purpose of punishment. It mixes the
application of modern Western systems with an Islamic understanding of
punishment. This is seen in the wording of the penal and criminal codes in Egypt,
such as using hatk al-a’erd which describes the sexual crimes against women to
be for any sexual assault against both genders.131 The term hatk al-a’erd
represents an Islamic understanding that committing such actions against
women is against the men protecting them, whether husbands, fathers or other
relatives. It is thus possible to understand why rape as a crime in the Egyptian
legal system is only applied to female victims, with specification that the criminal
action is to be in a singular form of the penetration of the female organ by the
male organ using force. Such a limitation of rape to female victims is based on
other traditional understandings of rape where part of the justification for
penalization is risk of pregnancy, rather than harm to the victim.132
Although the penal code adopted in 1937, like the modern European codes, did
not include physical punishment, it kept the death penalty for several crimes
including murder and treason. The classification of crimes is much closer to the
modern legal system than the traditional one, where crimes are classified into
128

Supra note 4
Supra note 3 and 4
130 Supra note 3
131
Egyptian
Penal
Code
article
268,
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf
132 Supra note 3, and id, Article 268 in Egyptian penal law stated that “Whoever
indecently assaults a person by force or threat, or attempts such assault shall be
punished with hard labor for three to seven years”.
129
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felonies, misdemeanors and violations. Accordingly, the severity of the crime
defines the punishment. Felonies are generally punished by jailing, and
sometimes by the death penalty, and misdemeanors are punished through
simple imprisonment and/or fines, and violations by fines below 100 Egyptian
pounds.133
The purpose of the new penal code was shared amongst revenge, deterrence
and rehabilitation, but there is no clear emphasis on rehabilitation, unlike
deterrence which is mentioned in court rulings explicitly. The Supreme
Constitutional Court ruling in case no.114, for the 21st judicial year, emphasized
deterrence as the main purpose of the punishment in the legal system:
As the purpose of penal punishment is the deterrence for the criminal
himself, for what he committed, and the public deterrence for others, to
push the ones who intended to commit similar crime to desist from
committing it.134
It can be understood from this ruling how the value of deterrence is prized in the
Egyptian legal system, whereby even the Supreme Constitutional Court justifies
the penal rule based on how effective a deterrent it is.
C. Court Of Cassation Interpretation Of Article 60 In The Egyptian
Penal Code
There are several controversial articles in the penal code concerning the
utilization of Islamic sharia’a. Article 60 is a well-known article that refers to an
allowance to avoid penal provisions under sharia’a. The provisions of the penal

penal code Article 9 stated that ”Crimes are of three kinds: First:
Felonies, Second: Misdemeanors, Third: Violations “,Article 10 stated that “
Felonies are crimes liable to the following penalties: Capital punishment,
Permanent hard labor Punishment, Temporary hard labor Punishment
Imprisonment”, Article 11 stated that “Misdemeanors are crimes liable to the
following penalties: Detention, Fine the ceiling of which exceeding one hundred
Egyptian pounds”, Article 12 stated that ”Violations are crimes penalized with a
fine the ceiling of which does not exceeding one hundred Egyptian pounds.”,
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf
134 See Appeal No. 114, for The juridical year 21, Supreme Constitutional Court ,
2nd of June 2001, vol.9, at 986: “ لما كان الهدف من العقوبة الجنائية هو الزجر الخاص للمجرم جزاء
133Egyptian

لما اقترف والردع العام للغير ليحمل من يحتمل ارتكابهم الجريمة علي اإلعراض عن إتيانها وكانت الفقرة الرابعة
 تقرر توقيع العقوبة المقررة الرتكاب الجناية أو الجنحة محل االتفاق علي مجرد االتفاق علي اقترافها48 من المادة
حتي ولو لم يتم ارتكابها فعال فإنها بذلك ال تحقق ردعا وال خاصا بل إن ذلك قد يشجع المتفقين علي ارتكاب
الجريمة محل االتفاق طالما أن مجرد االتفاق علي اقترافها سيؤدي إلي معاقبتهم بذات عقوبة ارتكابها.
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code may not apply to any deed committed in good faith, pursuant to a right
determined by virtue of the sharia’a.135
Despite the simple wording of Article 60, there are ambiguities about the
meaning of the word sharia’a and how it can be interpreted. It is the same
problem as the multi-jurisdiction of Islamic schools seen in courts dealing with
Article 60. Generally, courts favor takhayur amongst Islamic schools and some
rulings favor an understanding of Islamic sharia’a similar to the Supreme
Constitutional Court’s understanding about certain and uncertain sharia’a.
1. Sharia’a Is Superior To Legal Text
Court of Cassation verdicts have faced appeals based on the righteous action of
the appellant. One of the well-known claims concerns the right of the husband
under Islamic sharia’a to discipline his wife using physical punishment.
In Court of Cassation case No. 6648 for the judicial year 63, an appeal was made
claiming that the appellant’s actions against his wife were not intended except as
an exercise of his right to discipline his wife. The actions of the husband lead to
the death of the wife as confirmed by autopsy reports of forensic experts. The
Court of Cassation refuted the claim:
It is affirmed that husband has a right to discipline his wife, but this right
is limited to slight harming, but exceeding such slight harm shall be
penalized even if it is only simple abrasions on the wife’s body… As it is
proved that the appellant did beat his wife causing her the described
injuries in the anatomy report… which cause after that her death, it is
sufficient to consider his action as out of the husband’s rights in
accordance to sharia’a and he shall be punished according to article
236136 of penal code137
135

Egyptian
Penal
code
Article
60,
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf
136 Egyptian Penal Code, Article 236 states that “Whoever wounds or beats
someone on purpose or gives him harmful material without meaning thereby to
kill, but doing that had led to death, shall be punished with hard labor or
imprisonment, for a period of three to seven years…”, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf
137See Appeal no.6848, for the Juridical year no.63, Court of Cassation, 22 nd of
December 1994, vol.45, at 1230: من المقرر أن التأديب حق للزوج ولكن ال يجوز أن يتعدى األيذاء

 حتى ولو كان األثر بجسم، وكان معاقبا عليه قانونا، فإحدث أذى بجسم زوجته،الخفيف فإذا تجاوز الزوج هذا الحد
 وكان الثابت من مدونات الحكم المطعون فيه أن، وكان ذلك،الزوجة لم يزد عن سجحات بسيطة لما كان ذلك
 وكان البين من،الطاعن قد اعتدى بالضرب على زوجته وأحدث بها اإلصابة الموصوفة بتقرير الصفة التشريحية
هذا التقرير أن المجنى عليها كدمة رضيه بأقصى الجزء األسفل ليسار الصدر وأعلى مقدم يسار البطن تحدث من
المصادمة بجسم صلب راض ثقيل نو عا من مثل قالب طوب احدثت تهتكا اصابيا بجوهر ونسيج الطحال نجم عنه
 فإن هذا كاف العتبار ما وقع منه خارجا عن،نزيف دموى داخلى غزير بداخل التجويف البطنى أدى إلى الوفاة
 وال، من قانون العقوبات236 حدود حقه المقرر بمقتضى الشريعة ومستوجبا للعقاب عمال بالفقرة الولى من المادة
 جناح على المحكمة إن هى التفتت عن هذا الدفاع القانونى الظاهر البطالن.
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So it is understood from the previous ruling that the Court of Cassation does not
deny the right of the husband to beat his wife as long as it does not leave traces
on her body such as abrasions. Accordingly, the severity of the beating is the
reason for the punishment not the action itself. This contradicts with what is
stated in Article 377 whereby “a penalty of fine not exceeding hundred Egyptian
pounds shall be inflicted on whoever commits any of the following deeds… (9)
Whoever creates an altercation, aggression, or light mischief that does not result
in beating or wounds.”
This is a very good example of a court ruling that interprets sharia’a in a broad
way allowing actions justified in Islamic sharia’a even if contradicting the legal
text of the penal law.
The preceding example is not a singular case. There are other cases such as
case No. 21092 of judicial year 63, whereby the appellant was accused of
possessing a firearm without a license. It is a crime under law no 394 for the year
1954; the law states that possessing or obtaining an arm with no license is a
felony, regardless of its usage or intent behind its possession. In this case, the
appellant used possession of the firearm as justification for having intention to
submit it to the public authorities.
The Court of Cassation accepted the appellant’s claim according to Article 60
justification although it is penalized in a different code as follows:
[A]s the article 25 of criminal procedural law allowed any person who is
informed by crime occurrence to report it to the public prosecution, which
could also proceed its authority with no necessity of request or
complaint. However some sorts of reporting will require such person to
keep the body of the crime (which is an arm in that case) to submit it to
the public authority, and it is possible that the possession or attainting of
such body is illegalized, but according to article no. 60 of penal code
which stated that the provisions of penal code may not apply to any deed
committed in good faith, pursuant to a right determined by virtue of the
sharia’a, and as proved from the merits of the challenged court verdict
that the appellant possession for the alleged arm was by intention to
submit it to the police officer, and that he submitted it directly after the
police arrival, which is a proof to negate the criminal intention on his
side… Hereby and accordingly the court is to repeal the appealed verdict
and restating and declaring the appellant as innocent 138

138See

Appeal no.21092, for the Juridical year 63, Court of Cassation , 27 th of
January 2003, vol. 54, page 220:  من قانون اإلجراءات الجنائية25 لما كان من المقرر أن المادة

 أن يبلغ النيابة العامة،أباحت لكل من علم بوقوع جريمة يجوز للنيابة العامة رفع الدعوى عنها بغير شكوى أو طلب
أو أحد مأموري الضبط القضائي عنها والتبليغ في بعض صوره يقتضي االحتفاظ بجسم الجريمة وتقديمه إلى السلطة
العامة وقد يكون جسم الجريمة مما يحظر القانون حيازته أو إحرازه إال أن االحتفاظ به في هذه الحالة مهما طال

52

V. CRIMINAL APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC SHARIA’A UNDER ARTICLE 60 OF THE
EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE
In this court decision it is not clear how Islamic sharia’a, in its essence, justifies
the deed of the appellant. It can be understood in the texts of the law itself. Law
No 394 for 1954 interprets arms possession as an intention to possess the arm
accompanied by practice of such intention. There are other understandings but in
this case the intention of possession did not exist which negates the legal text.
The court ignored previous justifications and decided to interpret the text broadly
using justifications from sharia’a. In both cases the court ruling favored Islamic
sharia’a application over the written law articles.
2. Justifying Modern Judicial Verdicts Based On
Sharia’a Understanding
In case no. 48168 for the judicial year no. 73, the Court of Cassation faced an
appeal regarding a judicial verdict sentencing the appellant in a drug crime as
being unconstitutional according to Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, and
against the rights of the appellant in accordance with Article 60 to evade
punishment as long his deed was justified under Islamic sharia’a. The Court
responded to this claim by reclassifying the criminalized action in accordance
with the Islamic classification. It considered the claim of the witness as wrongful
as long as the crime was one of the ta’zir crimes and not hudu’d as follows:
[T]he challenge of unconstitutionality of the court verdict as the
accusation was built on singular witness of the police officer, on contrary
of the limits of witnesses required by blessed sharia’a is invalid, that is
because the witnesses number limit in Islamic sharia’a is for the
witnessing in hudu’d and life crimes but the accusation of the trial is
related to one of Ta’zir crime that is under judge’s discretion with no
obligation of following certain tool of proofing. 139
Here the Court of Cassation surprisingly classified the crimes of the modern legal
system into hudu’d and ta’zir similar to the traditional classification. The Court
avoided the modern classification of crimes into felonies, misdemeanors and

ً أمده ال تتغير طبيعته مادام القصد منه وهو التبليغ لم يتغير وإن كان في ظاهره يتسم بطابع الجريمة وذلك عم
ال
 من قانون العقوبات التي تنص على أنه "ال تسرى أحكام قانون العقوبات على كل فعل ارتكب بنية سليمة60 بالمادة
ً عم
 وكان البين مما سرده الحكم المطعون فيه أن إحراز الطاعن، لما كان ذلك."ال بحق مقرر بمقتضى الشريعة
،السالح المضبوط لم يكن إال بقصد االحتفاظ به لتسليمه لمأمور الضبط القضائي وهو ما بادر به بمجرد وصوله إليه
 وإذ كان الحكم المطعون فيه قد خالف هذا النظر وجرى في قضائه،وهو ما ينتفي معه قصد اإلحراز بمعناه القانوني
 فإنه يكون قد أخطأ في تطبيق القانون وتأويله،على توافر القصد الجنائي لمجرد إحراز الطاعن للسالح المضبوط
ً بما يوجب نقضه والحكم ببراءة الطاعن عم
 من قانون حاالت وإجراءات الطعن أمام39 ال بالفقرة األولى من المادة
محكمة النقض
139

See Appeal no. 48186, for The Juridical year 73, Court of Cassation, 8th of
February 2010, vol. 54, at 224 أما القول بعدم دستورية المحاكمة لقيام االتهام على شهادة الضابط وحده

 ذلك بأن المشاحة حول نصاب الشهادة إنما،على خالف النصاب الذي تطلبته الشريعة الغراء فهو ظاهر البطالن
تركزت حول الشهادة على الحدود والدماء بينما التهمة الماثلة تتعلق بجريمة تعزيزية ال يتقيد القاضي في إثباتها بأداة
معينة.
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violations, by not justifying the burden of proof on the basis of criminal procedural
law which allows the judge to state his decision as long as his belief in the
evidence is sufficient to reach its verdict. The Court instead justified its decision
on the grounds that ta’zir crimes do not require the same proof of authenticity as
hudu’d. Classifying drug laws as being part of ta’zir crimes allows the judge to
depend on the presence of one witness as enough proof.
3. Sharia’a Is Inferior To Legal Text
The Court of Cassation followed another set of verdicts consistent with modern
law philosophy. It kept the legal text’s superiority over other sharia’a and fiqh
texts. One of the examples is case no. 1193 for the judicial year 29. In this case,
an appeal was raised before the Court of Cassation to challenge the criminal
sentence imposed on the appellants for performing an abortion. The merits of the
case are that two husbands agreed to the abortions and went to a well-known
doctor to perform the medical procedure. Both the husbands and the doctor were
condemned for committing the crime of abortion in accordance with the Egyptian
penal code, which penalizes abortion even with the free will of the mother. The
appellant challenged that court verdict on the basis of Islamic sharia’a which
allows abortion till the fourth month of pregnancy, considering it as a rightful deed
for husbands under sharia’a. The Court of Cassation refuted the claim of
justification on the sharia’a basis on two grounds. The first one is that abortion is
criminalized by direct legal text, and the second one is that abortion allowance is
not part of the certain sharia’a under Article 60:
[T]hat the appellant stated that Islamic sharia’a allowed abortion till four
pregnancy months and the Article 60 of penal code allows what is
allowed by sharia’a, this appeal is unacceptable as long as the law
punish abortion action, illegalizing it; that Article 60 allows deeds that are
committed pursuant to right stated by law in general, and the illegalizing
of abortion by legislator prevent considering it as pursuant to a right but
instead it is a crime that its committer deserve punish for it… In addition
the court didn’t agree that abortion allowance in Islamic sharia’a is from
the certain area in its authenticity but it’s a controversial output of Ijtihad
of scholars.140

140See

Appeal no. 1193, For the Juridical year 29, Court, Of Cassation, 23rd of
November 1959, vol.10, at 952: فإن ما عرض إليه الطاعن في دفاعه أمام محكمة الموضوع من أن

 من قانون العقوبات تبيح60 الشريعة اإلسالمية تبيح إجهاض الجنين الذي لم يتجاوز عمره أربعة أشهر وأن المادة
 ما عرض إليه الطاعن من ذلك ال يكون مقبو ًال ما دام القانون يعاقب على اإلسقاط ويجعل منه- ما تبيحه الشريعة
ً  إنما تبيح األفعال التي ترتكب عم60  وألن المادة،ًال محرما
ً فع
 وتحريم الشارع،ال بحق قرره القانون بصفة عامة
لإلسقاط يحول دون اعتبار هذا الفعل مرتبطاً بحق وإنما يجعل منه إذا وقع جريمة يستحق جانيها العقاب الذي فرضه
 وال يعيب الحك م أن ال يتناول في أسبابه هذا الدفاع ويرد عليه ألن هذا الرد مستفاد من سياق الحكم،الشارع لفعلته
236 و263 و260 وما هو ماثل فيه من الوقائع التي أسندت للمتهمين بوصف كونها جرائم تنطبق عليها المواد
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In this court verdict, the Court presented the legal text as being of a higher level
than the unwritten rules of sharia’a, applying the criminalizing rule of abortion
even with the existence of sharia’a allowance according to one or more jurists.
The court considered what is meant by sharia’a in Article 60 as being the law
itself. Accordingly, personal rights that exempt punishment are only those that do
not contradict with legal texts. The surprising part of the verdict is the statement
that the allowance of abortion is not from the certain sharia’a. Here the Court of
Cassation is trying to apply the Supreme Constitutional Court understanding of
certain and uncertain sharia’a, insisting that certain sharia’a is the meaning of
Article 60. Accordingly, the court required such sharia’a’s proof of authenticity
and meaning to negate the penal code legislation.
D. Conclusion
The Egyptian criminal legal system maintains Islamic sharia’a as part of its
application, as seen in Article 60. As the courts are uncertain about the meaning,
values and purposes of applying Islamic sharia’a, court rulings reflect
interpretation of Islamic sharia’a differently and on a case-by-case basis.
Sometimes the courts follow stated legal rules even if they contradict with Islamic
sharia’a. In other rulings the Islamic sharia’a application ignores the legal text.
Because the Egyptian Court of Cassation has not formulated a consistent
mechanism for applying Islamic sharia’a in accordance with Article 60, ongoing
uncertainty

and

lack

of

consistency

in

decisions

has

ensued.

 إال أنه بالنظر إلى أن الطاعن قد أورد ما أثاره أمام محكمة الموضوع في، من قانون العقوبات41 و2 - 1 /40و
 فإن هذه المحكمة ال ترى بد ًا من أن،خصوص هذا الدفع على الصورة التي ضمنها الوجه األول من أسباب طعنه
ً تشير إلى أن ما يقوله الطاعن من إباحة الشريعة اإلسالمية إجهاض الحمل الذي لم يتجاوز أربعة أشهر ليس أص
ال
 وال محل لالعتراض بالرأي الذي،ثابتاً في أدلتها المتفق عليها وإنما هو اجتهاد للفقهاء انقسم حوله الرأي فيما بينهم
.يظاهر ما يذهب إليه الطاعن تلقاء الوضع القائم في التشريع المعمول به من تحريم هذا الفعل كما سلف القول
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VII. Conclusion
At the end of this research, it is interesting to note how the legal system in
Egypt has been affected by the modernist ideas of the legal elite in Egypt
and Western influence at the end of the nineteenth century. The most
innovative idea was using Islamic legal principles such as takhayur and talfiq
as modernizing tools. This idea succeeded practically in developing the legal
system from the traditional one. The legal elite kept those principles to create
a hybrid legal system resting between modernity and traditionalism. It was
required to justify the modern legal text and win its acceptance. Incorporating
Islamic sharia’a in the modern legal system was not only justified for social
reasons, but also as being part of Egypt’s legal heritage and inspiration for
developing the legal text similar to Roman law in the Western legal system.
Such hybridity in a legal system leads to uncertainty in legal application
because of the differences between the traditional and modern usages of
takhayur and talfiq. The traditional application of sharia’a is based on the
divinity of its rules, which justifies takhayur and talfiq amongst Islamic
schools. In general, modern law does not embrace such a holistic approach
in the legal texts. In addition, takhayur and talfiq were applied by laypersons
and not state authorities as encouraged by Abdou and Sanhuri. The
application of sharia’a and fiqh in the new legal system allowed courts to rely
on different legal opinions which threatened the singularity of the legal
answer.
The judicial verdicts interpret Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution reflect very
notable confusion regarding the meaning of sharia’a and its classification.
The Court of Cassation has taken several different positions regarding Article
2, by considering it a legislative issue, and at other times as a general rule
applied to legal text through certain sharia’a principles. The Supreme
Constitutional Court postponed interpreting Article 2 till 1993, when it
interpreted it in the well-known case no.7. It classified sharia’a into certain
and uncertain, whereby the certain sharia’a may not be breached by laws or
judicial verdicts as part of the legal system. While the uncertain sharia’a is
not identified specifically, the court considered it an open field for Ijtihad of
legislative organs to exercise takhayur and talfiq. The encouragement of
such classification is the court’s solution to the dilemma of applying sharia’a
within a modern legal system. Despite this attempted solution, uncertainty
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has remained in the legal system because of the non-clarity of the
classification of certain and uncertain sharia’a.
The Court of Cassation in its verdicts regarding Article 60 faced the problem
of applying sharia’a as an exemption from the application of penal laws. But
the Court cannot unify its policy regarding sharia’a, while the court
encouraged the superiority of the legal text in abortion cases over the
sharia’a texts, and in favoring the husband’s sharia’a right in disciplining his
wife physically. Such uncertainty in dealing with sharia’a is the problem
regarding its position it in the legal system.
Efforts of the modernist thinkers to establish a new legal system which favors
a precise form of legal application is worthy of respect. The current legal
system has evolved as result of these efforts in comparison to the traditional
system of the qadi. But this development was not sufficient to avoid later
complexities and uncertainty of sharia’a including within the legal system. It is
expected that the Egyptian legal system will be further developed following
the January 25th Uprising and its aftermath. It may require separating
sharia’a understandings from the legal text to achieve clarity of the legal rule.
Such efforts to develop the legal system is connected to and not separate
from attempts to understand the current legal system and its origins.
Understanding the past and the present helps us to understand the future.
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